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Following Russia’s incursion into Crimea, ambiguous warfare and strategic ambiguity 
used during the Ukrainian conflict have been cited by NATO as a threat to the future of 
European security. The use of strategic ambiguity holds many benefits over clear 
communications, particularly its ability to foster multiple interpretations of and create a 
united diversity around a specific issue during times of crisis. Within the Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies and Dr Holger Stritzel’s analytical frameworks for 
securitization and desecuritization, this research asks the question of whether strategic 
ambiguity can be used as a tactic to influence audiences for the purpose and process of 
desecuritization. Critical discourse analysis is used in a case study of the Ukrainian 
conflict, analysing NATO and Kremlin speeches and transcripts, to identify and analyse 
how Russia has used strategic ambiguity as a tactic for desecuritization in order to 
influence its targeted audiences. Much focus is also directed towards explaining how 
strategic ambiguity has benefited Russia’s campaign of information and psychological 
warfare. The outcome of this studied has shown mixed results. The author argues from 
the position that while Russia has been overall unsuccessful in its attempted 
desecuritization, strategic ambiguity still serves as an important tactic for influencing 
and dividing perceptions of targeted audiences for the purpose and process of 
desecuritization. 
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‘Russia's military operation against Crimea relied on … unconventional warfare as well 
as cyberattacks and significant information-warfare activity, using conventional media 
and the Internet to spread its propaganda. This is a 21st-century offensive employing 
21st-century tools for strategic deception and calculated ambiguity to achieve Moscow's 
political goals.’  -  NATO supreme allied commander for Europe; General Philip M. 
Breedlove (2014).  
 
The character and tactics of warfare are subject to consistent change. As technology, 
doctrine, organisation and societies continue to develop, so does their ability to 
influence the strategic policy of how wars are fought (Von Clausewitz, Howard, & 
Paret, 1989, p. 88). These changes have occurred both rapidly and over an extended 
period of time throughout history, with different forms of warfare accruing specific 
characteristics and tactics that define them from others. 
In more recent times, these changes have been periodised as ‘generations of warfare’. 
According to Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson (1989), the transformation 
of the character and tactics of warfare in the post-cold war era has largely been 
distinguished by the transition from what is known as third generation to fourth 
generation warfare, where the character of warfare shifts from state and military based 
forms of conflict to decentralised forms where there is no clear distinction between war 
and politics, or soldiers and civilians as the decentralisation of state centred conflict 
loosens a nation states monopoly on combat  forces. Thus the tactics of fourth 
generation warfare have become characterised by terrorism, amorphous and 
asymmetrical conflict, the tactical use of non-combatants, networked rather than 
hierarchical group structures, non-linear pressure tactics, and most importantly, strategic 
information and psychological warfare (IAPW). While fourth generation warfare places 
a large emphasis on the decentralisation from state centred forms of conflict, it is 
important to note that this type of conflict is also employed by states (Hammes, 2007). 
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One of the key strategies of fourth generation warfare is to collapse or influence the 
enemy internally, rather than defeat them physically, with targets focusing on the 
enemy’s society as a whole, their culture, popular support for the conflict and resistance 
to outside influence. Such a strategy is primarily achieved through the increasing power 
of information.  The emergence and continued ascendency of the internet as the primary 
medium of information has enabled the exploitation of information content and delivery 
to a global audience, who are susceptible to influence from highly tailored IAPW 
campaigns (Hammes, 2007; Lind et al., 1989).  
In the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and subsequent conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine, there has been much conjecture as to what the character of this warfare is and 
what tactics it represents.  Berzins (2014) argues that the conflict represents a new 
generation of warfare, where the main conflict is mental and the objective is to 
psychologically manipulate and influence the opponent’s military and civilian 
population to support the attacker. He also argues that the enemy of Russia in this 
context is Western civilization in its entirety. Darczewska (2014) states that Russian 
cyber and internet warfare are aspects of fourth generation warfare that have evolved 
from technological and social development. She also states that Russia views 
information as a dangerous armament in its struggle against the dominance of Western 
civilisation and liberalism. While there is argumentation in regards to the characteristics 
of this warfare, there is agreement in regards to its use of information being used as a 
tactical weapon. This tactic plays a predominant role in influencing the perceptions of 
targeted audiences using IAPW and strategic communications.  
As changes in the character and tactics of warfare occur, it is essential that such changes 
are identified, analysed and evaluated to ensure that an adversary doesn’t gain a tactical 
or organisational strategic advantage that may be costly or possibly lead to defeat (Lind 
et al., 1989).  By identifying, analysing and evaluating such changes that may pose risks 
and threats, weaknesses can also be identified where policy changes may be needed to 
face these new challenges. 
Such strategic and tactical changes as the use of strategic ambiguity and ambiguous 
warfare (AW) have been duly noted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
leaders, with NATO supreme allied commander for Europe General Philip M. 
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Breedlove (2014) stating that ‘surprise, deception and strategic ambiguity have been 
adeptly employed by Russia against Ukraine’ and that ‘this strategy, quite simply, has 
significant implications for Europe's future security’. In a recently released paper by the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) Defence Committee (2014) of the U.K. House of Commons, it 
is highlighted that ambiguous warfare tactics are ‘intended to influence the decision 
making of an adversary by providing that adversary with information that will 
reflexively lead them to pursue particular courses of action’. It also states that 
ambiguous warfare and its associated tactics ‘represents the most immediate threat to its 
NATO neighbours and other NATO Member States’. Ambiguity has played a crucial 
role in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, particularly in its use to influence public 
perceptions. While such tactics are not necessarily new, it can be argued that the 
successful emergence of strategic ambiguity and ‘ambiguous warfare ‘ as a threat during 
the Ukrainian conflict has been greatly assisted by the ability to influence individuals 
through combining uncertainty with both language and action.  
As it has been identified that strategic ambiguity and AW are immediate threats to 
NATO and it member states, there exists a need to develop policies, doctrines and 
tactics to be able to successfully safeguard NATO and its member states from these 
potential future threats (General, 2014). Thus this study seeks to contribute to ongoing 
NATO and military research, by identifying, analysing and evaluating how strategic 
ambiguity has been constructed as a strategy by Russia during the Ukrainian conflict to 
influence targeted audiences. This is not a study of AW in its entirety, but rather a study 
of how Russia has constructed a strategy of strategic ambiguity in order to influence and 
desecuritize NATO actions and actions by its member states.  By understanding how 
Russia has constructed strategic ambiguity within its political discourse in relation to its 
actions during the Ukrainian conflict, NATO can be greatly assisted in understanding 
the character and tactical nature of this threat, thus being better equipped to develop 
methods and techniques to counter this strategy. Considering the large degree of 
concern within NATO the Ukrainian conflict has created, this research is significant as 
it assists in understanding how a certain strategies and tactics can use and neutralise 
information to influence and affect a nations or organisations ability to respond to 
certain threats. Given that the Russian Federation is currently suffering from potentially 
threatening and destabilising economic decline due to Western sanctions, the need and 
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timeliness of such research is essential in assisting to maintain European peace and 
security. 
The structure for analysis in this study employs the Copenhagen School of Security 
Studies (CSSS) conceptual framework of securitization and desecuritization.  The 
success of a securitization act being achieved is largely dependent upon the targeted 
audience being convinced by a securitizing actor that a specific issue represents a real 
and legitimate security threat to a referent object, by which extraordinary measures need 
to be taken to solve the perceived problem.  Thus by initiating a securitizing move, the 
justification for security to survive is key to legitimising and mobilising public support 
for the use of extraordinary measures outside of relative norms (Barry Buzan et al., 
1998, p. 21). 
Concerning desecuritization, there remains a degree of uncertainty and debate 
surrounding its conceptual framework. . It has been regarded as the conceptual twin of 
securitization which counters the process of securitization, delegitimizes and dejustifies 
its enabled extraordinary measures to resolve a perceived problem, and returns the use 
of extraordinary measures from emergency politics back into the realm of normal 
politics and politicization. Thus as the success of both securitization and 
desecuritization are largely dependent on their ability to influence and convince targeted 
audiences that emergency measures are either required or not required to resolve a 
specific issue, the calculated use of language and discourse plays a key role in 
mobilizing public opinion in favour of either the securitization or desecuritization of a 
specific issue  (Hansen, 2012).  
Therefore, when analysing how Russia has constructed the strategy of strategic 
ambiguity, the CSSS framework for analysis, as well as that proposed by Stritzel (2007) 
which focuses on the context of the securitization and desecuritization processes, are 
appropriate as they provide the relevant structure to research how the calculated use of 
language and discourse has been constructed by Russia in regards to its opposition to 
NATO’s stance of securitization during the Ukrainian conflict. They also assist to 
identify how Russia has used strategic ambiguity within its political discourse and 
IAPW campaign to influence NATO member states internally in order to attempt to 
desecuritize NATO’s current stance of securitization.  
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As the calculated use of language and discourse plays a key role in influencing and 
mobilizing public opinion in favour of either securitization or desecuritization, the 
qualitative research method of critical discourse analysis is employed. This method is 
used to identify the construction of strategic ambiguity in the political discourse 
between NATO and Russia, and also analyse its relevant context in regards to the 
Ukrainian conflict.   
This research aims to identify how strategic ambiguity can be used as a tactic for 
desecuritization through its ability to be able to influence targeted audiences. The 
objective is to analyse where and how Russia has used strategic ambiguity within its 
language and discourse, to be able to maximise their potential influence over targeted 
audiences for the purposes and process of desecuritization. Through this analysis, the 
success of strategic ambiguity as a tactic for desecuritization can be evaluated, and 
recommendations can be formulated to assist NATO in countering such actions. The 
results of this research have been mixed. It is argued that strategic ambiguity still serves 
as important tactic for the purpose and process of desecuritization. 
This study is structured in the following four chapters. The first chapter consists of an 
overview and explains the concepts of this study, including IAPW, strategic 
communications and the strategy of strategic ambiguity, as well as the theoretical 
approach of the CSSS framework of analysis for securitization, and desecuritization. 
The second chapter explains the research methodology of this study and also outlines 
the main research questions to be answered.  The third chapter consists of identifying 
how the strategy of strategic ambiguity has been constructed within the political 
discourse of NATO and Russia, and also analyse and evaluate strategic ambiguities’ 
ability to influence European and international audiences to desecuritize in the relevant 
context through the use of Russia’s IAPW campaign. The fourth and final chapter of 
this study concludes with the results of this research, and also engages in discussion 






1. Concepts and Theoretical Approach
 
   
 
In this chapter, the relevant concepts and the theoretical approach to this study is 
clarified and explained. This is done by using the most up to date and historically 
important literature for each topic. The initial purpose of this chapter is to familiarise 
readers with IAPW and strategic ambiguity as a tactic and a strategy. The objective of 
this chapter is to highlight and analyse the current debate surrounding the conceptual 
framework of securitization and desecuritization. The author of this research also uses 
this chapter to justify the position that the CSSS concepts of securitization and 
desecuritization serve as an effective framework for the analysis of language and 
discourse in order to influence. Thus initially, the concepts of IAPW and strategic 
ambiguity are reviewed, followed by a critical analysis of the current debate 
surrounding the framework of the concepts of securitization and desecuritization, 
proceeded by the justification for the use of the CSSS concepts of securitization and 
desecuritization for the purposes of this study.  
 
1.1. Information and Psychological Warfare  
Information warfare (IW) and psychological warfare (PW) are closely related terms. 
The concept of IW is used to generalise a wide variety of defensive, offensive, 
operational and tactical measures that use information and communications in order to 
gain a competitive advantage or information superiority over an opponent. The U.K. 
Ministry of Defence (2013) defines information superiority as the ‘competitive 
advantage gained through the continuous, directed and adaptive employment of relevant 
information principles, capabilities and behaviours’. 
As IW includes a wide variety of operational and tactical measures for both defensive 
and offensive operations, including command and control warfare, intelligence based 
warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, hacker warfare, economic 
information warfare and cyber warfare (Libicki, 1995),  there has been much academic 
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debate as to what the term means and how it should be defined. Historically, IW is 
rooted in its military and conflict origins. Thomas Rona , an early proponent of  IW who 
is credited with coining the term, defines it as  ‘the strategic, operation, and tactical 
level competitions across the spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, conflict, war, 
war termination, and reconstitution/restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries 
or enemies using information means to achieve their objectives’ (Stephenson & Gilbert, 
1999, p. 7). But as Libicki (1995) states, such a definition is far too broad, can be used 
to describe virtually any environment, and fails to conceptually delimit IW.  
In noting this broadness in the conceptual basis of IW, particularly its fusion with cyber 
systems and the ever expanding organisational actors who use it, Williams (2010) 
argues that the essence of IW is about ‘using information to make decisions and for the 
adversary, trying to influence, deny, or disrupt information used in decision making 
processes. This is the fundamental objective of information warfare as decision making 
is dependent on the quality, amount and correctness of the information available at the 
time the decisions are made’. By focusing on the information component in describing 
the objective of IW, Williams (2010) description of what IW is provides clarity in 
understanding this broad concept. While the warfare component of IW is quite broad in 
its application, the fundamental use of information as a potential tactic or weapon to 
affect decision making accurately portrays how information is used in competitive and 
conflict environments to achieve a strategic advantage. 
Hutchinson and Warren (2001) expand further on the notion of information as the 
primary focus of IW, stating that  ‘protagonists can attempt to directly alter data or to 
deprive competitors of access to it’ and that by using subtler techniques such as 
language, ‘the way the data is interpreted can be changed by altering the context that it 
is viewed’. Hutchinson (2002) further devolves on this idea by  explaining the 
relationship between data, information and knowledge. He argues that data describes the 
attributes of things, objects or scenarios, and that knowledge is the mindset of 
individuals which has been shaped by personal experiences. Information is the product 
of interpreted data within the bounds of one’s own knowledge. Thus by manipulating 
the data, or changing the context or perception in which it is interpreted by the 
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individuals knowledge, information can be denied, altered or manipulated to meet 
IAPW objectives (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Result of manipulated data and knowledge on information (W. Hutchinson, 
2002). 
This framework explains how information is the primary focus and weapon of IW. Yet 
Hutchinson (2002) fails to successfully delimit the concept of IW. While he argues the 
relevance of the concept in an individual, commerce, governance and military context, 
the manipulation of data or knowledge can be used in any environment, from a personal 
argument to a warfare scenario. This raises the question as to what constitutes a state of 
warfare in which information transcends from being used to gain a competitive edge to 
being used to meet objectives in conflict scenarios.  
As Arquilla (1999, p. 384) states,  ‘since the introduction of information warfare, the 
concept has evolved and broadened to include activities that, while information-driven, 
are not considered warfare’. This has led to the emergence of the view that such 
activities can be categorised into two distinct groups. Information Operations (IO), 
which can be viewed as IW operations and tactics during times of peace, competition, or 
prior to the emergence of hostilities, and IW, which can be viewed as IW operations and 
tactics during times of war to meet specific conflict objectives and achieve information 
superiority (Arquilla, 1999, p. 384; Treadwell, 1998). While the categorisation of these 
two concepts does not define what constitutes a state of IW, they do characterise the 
difference of what can be considered IW and IO. 
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According to Treadwell (1998), there is no clear criteria to judge as to what constitutes  
IO and a state of IW. While more traditional warfare concepts such as a declaration of 
war may serve to effectively delimit IO and IW, the reality and character of fourth 
generation warfare operates outside of such traditional notions. The ability of 
combatants to blend in with civilians and non-combatants, and the tactics they use 
continues to create uncertainty and blur the distinction between civil society and the 
reach of military responsibility (Taddeo, 2012).  Although there still remains questions 
and difficulty in defining and delimiting IW, for the purposes of this research, IW is 
defined as ‘Information Operations conducted during time of crises or conflict to 
achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries’ (Jones, 
Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002, p. 591). 
Psychological Warfare (PW) or Psychological Operations (PO) is considered a subset of 
IW and IO, which focuses on influencing individuals beliefs, attitudes, behaviours and 
emotions (BABE) through the strategic and calculated use of information, language and 
discourse. While it could be argued that both terms could be characterised and 
attempted to be delimited similarly to IO and IW, they are used synonymously. They 
are more traditionally known as propaganda. Whereas violent forms of warfare focus on 
behaviour modification through conflict, PO (or PW) focus on behaviour modification 
through influence (Schmid, 2005). According to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010), PO 
can be defined as ‘planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals’. For this to be accomplished, it is stated that PO ‘must have a clearly 
defined mission, the ability to analyse and evaluate targets and their effects, a reliable 
media transmission, and a rapid ability to implement their activities. PSYOP 
(Psychological Operations) depend on communications to ensure proper execution of 
the mission and objectives. This is accomplished by command and control, preplanning, 
and support from all levels of the chain of command’ (Staff, 2003).  As PO are 
dependent on reliable media transmissions, it can be argued that the use of such 
strategic foreign language media as RT is essential in communicating PO objectives 
aimed at influencing foreign audiences. 
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The use of strategically placed media in this regard allows a state, organisation or group 
to convey specific messages containing manipulated data, and to alter the context and 
perception of information for target audiences to meet specific IAPW objectives (W. 
Hutchinson, 2002). By supplying a consistent stream of manipulated and altered 
information, largely focusing on news that projects anti-Western views, sentiment and 
interests, RT effectively represents Russian government interests and operates in unison 
with its foreign policy objectives. This allows the media network to be used as an 
operational arm of Russia’s IAPW campaigns to influence global opinions and 
perspectives in order to be more aligned with Russia’s interests (Bidder, 2013).  
Such is the power of RT’s ability to communicate influence, and affect the  BABE’s of 
its audiences, that in regards to Russia’s annexation of Crimea during the Ukrainian 
conflict, Lithuania minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicius  stated; 
‘Russia Today's propaganda machine is no less destructive than military marching in 
Crimea.’ (Linkevicius, 2014) 
Thus it can be argued that due to RT’s financing and intimate relationship with the 
Russian government, along with its consistent reporting of anti-Western news and 
promotion of Russian interests, the media organisation is used as a tool by the Russian 
government to achieve strategic IAPW objectives. Due to its immense international 
popularity on the internet and its social reach, RT has the ability to influence large 
foreign population groups. For the purposes of this research, PO is defined as by the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010). 
 
1.1.2. Russian views on Information and Psychological Warfare 
The concept of modern IAPW has been a developing one in Russia since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. While traditional propaganda and information techniques have existed 
for some time, the notion of the use of IAPW as strategic assets in conflict scenarios has 
largely re-emerged in parallel with the emergence of the internet. This is evident in both 
the first and second Russian – Chechen War, with the strategic use of the internet by 
Chechen forces being able to rapidly outmanoeuvre Russian information sources. This 
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forced then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to seriously consider the role of 
IAPW and the cyber arena in deciding the outcome of future conflicts, stating that ‘we 
surrendered this terrain some time ago … but now we are entering the game again’ 
(Giles, 2011). In response to Chechen successes in breaking the Russian information 
blockade over the conflicts through the use of the internet to disseminate their 
information, the Russian government rapidly increased the activities and number of 
websites of their own news agencies, using IAPW to deliver specific messages to 
influence targeted audiences (Goble, 1999). The Russian Chechen Wars displayed the 
immense power of the use of information as a weapon, whereby a small and 
underdeveloped opponent can achieve information superiority over a world power and  
much stronger adversary through the strategic use of IAPW (Heickerö, 2010). 
The development of IAPW in the Russian Federation since the nineties has progressed 
along a different definitional and categorisation path than in the West. Whereas Western 
concepts of IW have focused on a wide variety of operational and tactical measures for 
both defensive and offensive operations as highlighted by Libicki (1995), and are 
categorised into the groups of simply ‘assigned and supporting capabilities and 
activities’ (Tatham, 2013) , Russia’s approach to IAPW has been categorised into two 
distinct groups, information technical and information psychological operations (T. 
Thomas, 2014). In 1995, an officer from Russia’s General Staff Academy defined IW 
as; 
‘Information warfare is a way of resolving a conflict between opposing sides. The goal 
is for one side to gain and hold an information advantage over the other. This is 
achieved by exerting a specific information/psychological and information/technical 
influence on a nation's decision-making system, on the nation's populous and on its 
information resource structures, as well as defeating the enemy's control system and his 
information resource structures with the help of additional means, such as nuclear 
assets, weapons and electronic assets’ (Aldis & McDermott, 2004, p. 209; T. L. 
Thomas, 1999). 
This categorization highlights the prominence of PO within the development of Russian 
IAPW theory. Such is the importance of PO within Russian political and military IAPW 
thinking, that information and psychological operations are considered independent 
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forms of conflict activity from the technical aspects of IAPW, whereby the Russian 
state is actively seeking ways to construct and win information psychological 
engagements to both defend their state and influence the decision making processes and 
populations of others (T.L. Thomas, 1999). Thus it can be argued the Russian state 
maintains a stronger emphasis on information superiority, whereby more importance is 
place in its IAPW theory on influencing decision makers, targeted audiences and 
maintaining a position of information dominance (Tatham, 2013).   
Russia was considered successful in its war with Georgia in 2008 in the context of 
conventional operations, however the Russian state and military was considered 
unsuccessful and inefficient in its IAPW campaign, with its failure to penetrate media 
narratives both within Georgia and the international community arguably contributing 
to their lack of success (Giles, 2011). As NATO states and their partners are highly 
concerned in regards to both Russian conventional and IAPW successes in the 
Ukrainian conflict, this raises two critical questions regarding the development of 
Russia’s IAPW theory. If the Russian state has gone from being unsuccessful and 
criticised, to being successful and regarded as an immediate threat in its application of 
IAPW operations in the space of six years between the Georgian and Ukrainian 
conflicts, what has changed in Russia’s approach to modern warfare and its IAPW 
operations, and how are they constructing their information psychological engagements 
to achieve success in influencing the decision makers, decision making processes and 
populations of others? 
 
1.2. Ambiguous warfare  
As the character and tactics of warfare are continuing to evolve at an increasingly rapid 
pace, there is much debate as to both what the character of modern wars represents and 
how they are conceptualised. Many argue that modern warfare has evolved beyond 
fourth generation warfare to fifth, sixth and new generations of war (Bērziņš, 2014; 
FitzGerald, 1994; G. Friedman, 2007; Hammes, 2007). However as new forms and 
generations of warfare continue to develop and their significance is debated, previous 
generational warfare continues to be used around the world, depending on the level of 
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social and technological development of a society, and the associated development of 
doctrine and organisation by their states, militaries and representatives. Given the 
character of and tactics used by Russia in the Ukrainian conflict, it can be argued that 
this war can be characterised as a fourth generational war (Kipp, 2014). However this 
does not mean that tactics and strategies cannot evolve and be used in this type of 
warfare, nor other strategies and tactics be used from different generations. Hammes 
(2007) defines fourth generation warfare as ‘uses all available networks - political, 
economic, social and military to convince the enemy's political decision makers that 
their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit’. 
Thus as fourth generation warfare places emphasis on the ability to influence the 
policies of decision makers, IAPW plays a key role in achieving objectives in this type 
of conflict. 
In regards to Russia’s approach to its conflict in Ukraine, both changes to its 
conventional and IAPW doctrine and organisation since the Georgian war have been in 
the process of transformation. Russian has recently embarked on a military 
modernisation programme that has focused on developing its conventional and IAPW 
capabilities, as well as its strategic doctrine and organisation due to the exposure of 
serious failures experienced during the 2008 Russian Georgian war, especially in 
regards to the military’s organisational and technological capabilities.  While such 
investments have dramatically improved Russia’s military capabilities, its relative 
conventional military weakness in comparison with the NATO alliance has pushed 
Russian military modernisation towards developing new and less conventional 
strategies and tactics for warfare (Committee, 2014). 
This is highlighted in their conflict with Ukraine. When compared with the Georgian 
War of 2008, the Russian military has upgraded its approach to modern warfare, from 
conventional third generation warfare tactics and strategies, to a more modernised and 
innovative fourth generation warfare approach that places a large emphasis on 
asymmetric and IAPW. According to Russian military Colonel Sergei Chekinov and 
retired Lieutenant General Sergei Bogdanov (2013), the rules of warfare in the modern 
era have changed significantly, and non-military tactics have come to play a much 
greater role in achieving strategic and political objectives, often surpassing the 
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importance of traditional military conduct. They argue that warfare has expanded from 
the traditional theatres of air, sea and land conflict, to incorporate the new environment 
of information, whereby without achieving information superiority over the opponent, 
no strategic or political objective can be achieved. 
Asymmetric warfare can be described as ‘a conflict in which the resources of two 
belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each 
other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of 
unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset 
deficiencies in quantity or quality’ (Hyslop, 2014, p. 137; Tomes, 2004). The term is 
closely related to and often used to describe fourth generation warfare. Both asymmetric 
warfare and fourth generation warfare are largely representative of the continuing 
strategic trend of 21st century warfare whereby the importance of IAPW, influence, the 
development of non-conventional strategies and tactics, the non-distinction of 
battlefields and the non-military aspects of war are continuing to challenge political and 
military thinking in how to construct and conduct 21st century warfare campaigns 
(Frunzeti, 2013). Gerasimov (2013) argues that the character and tactics of asymmetric 
warfare and the growing warfare trends of the 21st century are supplemented by the 
strategy of concealment in the conduct of special forces and informational conflict, 
where the open use of military forces, often under the pretence as peacemakers are used 
only at strategic instances or to finalise the conflict.  As both the concealment of 
military actions and the  use of IAPW to confuse and influence an enemy are key 
elements of 21st century warfare, the importance of the use of IAPW and strategic 
communications in order to influence and to meet strategic and political objectives, as 
in the case of the annexation of Crimea, cannot be understated in the construction and 
conduct of 21st century conflict (Bērziņš, 2014).  
The combination of the use of asymmetric and fourth generation warfare, military 
concealment, disorganisation and confusion of the enemy, and a large emphasis on 
IAPW as witnessed in the Ukrainian conflict, has led to this type of conflict being 
labelled as a new type of warfare, termed as Ambiguous Warfare (AW). In his oral 
disposition before the UK House of Commons defence committee, Institute for 
Statecraft director Chris Donnelly describes AW as; 
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‘a form of warfare that integrates the use of conventional and unconventional force; 
integrates the use of force with non-military tools of war—cyber, economic, political; 
integrates the whole with an immensely powerful information warfare programme; and 
is backed up by an ideology. This is a change in the nature of conflict. The aim of the 
whole operation is to break the integrity of the state—in this case, Ukraine— before 
there is any need to cross its borders with an invasion force and trigger an Article 5 
situation, were it a NATO country. So we are seeing a form of warfare that is operating 
under our reaction threshold’ (United Kingdom House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2014). 
 This is not the first time that the term AW has been used. In 1998 at a United States 
army war college conference discussing land power and AW in Colombia, AW was 
described as a strategic war that ‘inherently makes building a consensus on who is the 
enemy and a proper strategy to defeat him an exceedingly complex task’ (Downes, 
1999). However it can be argued that its use by Russia during the Ukrainian conflict is 
the first time AW has been used with such successful tenacity. Through the use of AW, 
Russia was successfully able to annex the Crimea peninsula, without either a full scale 
military invasion and without even a single casualty. It was also able to do so with 
minimal resistance from both NATO and the international community. Such actions 
raise serious questions in regards to how Russia has constructed its AW and IAPW 
campaigns to be able to influence its targeted audiences to meet its strategic objectives. 
The ability of Russia to take over the territory of another country without a major war 
and with minimal resistance highlights the intensity and success of Russia’s PO. 
 
1.2.2. Strategic communications  
Understanding, engaging and influencing key and targeted audiences is crucial in the 
success of achieving strategic objectives in a state or groups IAPW campaign. By 
focusing on the cognitive context of an information environment, through the use of 
strategic communications, targeted audiences can be more successfully engaged and 
influenced by understanding their culture, BABE’s, and whom they trust. Whilst similar 
to IAPW, the concept of strategic communications focuses more on influencing 
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population groups whereas IAPW focuses more on influencing decision makers and 
decision making processes.  Messages to be interpreted are not only in the form of 
verbal and visual communications, but also in the actions of a state or group, as these 
can also influence the BABE’s of targeted audiences (Murphy, 2008).  
NATO defines the concept of strategic communications as ‘the coordinated and 
appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public 
Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo 
Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance 
policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims’ (Reding, 
Weed, & Ghez, 2010). The objective of strategic communications is to influence 
targeted audiences into cognitively accepting a specific narrative and engaging a state or 
groups way of thinking, thus allowing them to achieve political and strategic objectives 
legitimately and with the consent and support of specific population groups (Figure2) 
(Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007). Thus in this context, 
IAPW is considered a subset of strategic communications that assist in creating and 
developing influence through systemic persuasion to achieve an overall strategic or 
political goal.  
Through the use of IAPW, strategic communications, and AW, a paradigm has been 
constructed by Russia in its conflict with Ukraine whereby the strategy of ambiguity has 
served as the driving force behind the development of the Russian states influence over 
domestic and foreign audiences to achieve their strategic objectives.  The creation of 
this paradigm has been aided by the importance Russia places on its PO, and their use of 
strategic communications and IAPW, using 21st century warfare tactics within the 
information environment to justify and legitimize their actions, and dejustify and 




Figure 2: Influencing populations through strategic communications (Reding, Weed & 
Ghez, 2010) 
Thus if strategic ambiguity has been used as a key communications approach in 
Russia’s IAPW and strategic communications campaigns during the Ukrainian conflict 
(Schenk, 2014), this raises the question as to how ambiguity is able to be used to create 
influence and persuade population groups into cognitively accepting specific narratives 
and engaging a state or groups point of view in a given scenario. If strategic ambiguity 
has played a key role in this conflict, how has it been constructed within Russia’s IAPW 
and strategic communications campaigns, conducted within AW, and been able to 
influence and persuade targeted audiences? 
 
1.2.3. Strategic Ambiguity 
The use of language and persuasive argumentation serve as powerful tools when vying 
for influence over social control, particularly when they are expressed by politicians, 
media, academics, journalists and individuals from a reliable background who have 
accumulated discursive power through symbolic capital and credibility. Those with the 
power to influence both the consensus, justification and legitimisation of discourse, or 
its dissent and rejection, do so through their ability to engage and influence targeted 
audiences to establish  cognitive social control through strategic communications and 
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discourse (Van Dijk, 1989). When attempting to influence large population groups, 
careful thought must go into constructing a strategy that can engage a wide variety of 
views. Also understanding the culture and BABE’s of targeted audiences allows those 
with symbolic capital and credibility to construct language and discourse that are more 
likely to influence to meet strategic objectives. 
In the Ukrainian conflict, the strategy that has been used in the construction of language 
and discourse has been that of strategic ambiguity (Breedlove, 2014; Schenk, 2014). 
The communication theory of strategic ambiguity was developed from the need to 
develop strategic communications for resilient organisations under difficult and 
uncertain conditions (Goodall, Trethewey, & McDonald, 2006).  Strategic ambiguity is 
understood to be the purposeful use of ambiguous language that avoids specifics in 
order to accomplish organisational goals (Eisenberg, 1984). Whereas clarity is effective 
as a communication strategy when the goal is to be clear, there are many incidences in 
which ambiguity can serve a greater purpose in strategic communications, particularly 
during times of rapid change and perceptual uncertainty (Leitch & Davenport, 2007). 
According to Eisenberg (1984), strategic ambiguity is useful as a communications 
strategy to foster unity among diversified viewpoints. Ambiguity allows for multiple 
interpretations of language or discourse, allowing individuals to maintain their 
individual interpretations while believing that others are in agreement with them. 
Strategic ambiguity is also helpful in addressing difficult issues when potential 
situations hinder the possibility for successful persuasion ‘by limiting disagreement and 
getting people to focus on the more abstract concepts on which they agree instead of the 
specific points upon which they disagree’ (Paul & Strbiak, 1997). It provides an 
apparatus whereby a variety of individuals from a variety of different ideological and 
political backgrounds can all be engaged and influenced through intentional uncertainty. 
It also aids the preservation and amplification of existing impressions, where ambiguity 
encourages individuals to select information which is consistent with their initial 
assessments (Eisenberg, 1984).    
Strategic ambiguity preserves privilege positions, facilitates organisational change,  also 
allows those with symbolic capital and credibility to engage in deniability (Sim & 
Fernando, 2010). By engaging in deniability, credible and authoritative figures are able 
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to maintain their privileged positions, and preserve potential future options in relation to 
strategic objectives (Eisenberg, 1984; Paul & Strbiak, 1997). This is an important aspect 
of strategic ambiguity, particularly when it is combined with one’s own actions, such as 
the Russian states use of AW in Ukraine. Through the use of deniability in strategic 
ambiguity, ones actions can be disguised as non-existent, or that not of their own, 
permitting them to play the innocent and mediating party in a conflict scenario, whilst 
allowing them greater flexibility in achieving their strategic objectives. 
Through the use of strategically ambiguous communications, by understanding the 
culture and BABE’s of targeted audiences, those with symbolic capital and credibility 
such as politicians, military, media, academics and journalists are capable of engaging 
and influencing individuals through language and discourse to influence their 
understanding of specific events, which helps stakeholders meet their strategic 
objectives (Van Dijk, 1989; Goodall, Trethewey, & McDonald, 2006). However such a 
strategy is not one that is used without caution. When using strategic ambiguity in a 
political or military context, such a strategy can be risky as it can often lead to the 
misinterpretation of a state’s intentions, and possibly lead to actions that impede their 
strategic objectives (Benson & Niou, 2000). Thus when using strategic ambiguity, 
careful thought must go into how the strategy is constructed and implemented to 
maintain a degree of uncertainty without misdirecting an opponent’s actions and 
reaction. Such a strategy has the power to influence large and diverse population 
groups, particularly during times of crisis where public opinion can be more easily 
influenced to become divisive, such as the Ukrainian conflict. 
 
1.3. Securitization and desecuritization as frameworks for analysis 
With the emergence of the theory of securitization, research into security has become 
one of the most dynamic and disputed disciplines in the study of international relations 
(M. C. Williams, 2003). The CSSS framework for analysis has broken away from 
traditional realist concepts of security that focus on power politics and militarised 
threats to security, by focusing on socially constructed discourse and language that are 
used to understand how the dynamics of security are discursively constructed (Fako, 
26 
 
2012).  Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) describe securitization as an ‘extreme version 
of politicisation’, whereby language is used to transform and frame specific issues as 
above and beyond the rules of the normal realm of politics and into emergency 
situations that need to be addressed so as to ensure state or group survival. Buzan and 
Waever (2003, p. 491) define securitization as ‘through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and 
exceptional measures to deal with the threat’.  
Securitization takes a constructivist approach to security and defines it as ‘speech acts’, 
which frames specific issues as security threats through the use of language and 
discourse. It contains three key points of reference; a referent object or thing of which is 
threatened, a securitizing actor who engages in securitizing speech acts and defines 
specific threats, and a targeted audience of which chooses to either accept or reject an 
attempted act of securitization. By talking security through speech acts, an actor can 
initiate a ‘securitizing move’ through their presentation of a specific issue as an 
existential threat. This is an attempt to ‘securitize’ a specific issue by moving it away 
from the realm of normative politics and public debate, and give the specific issue 
special status where its resolution can be achieved through extraordinary means and not 
be restricted by common practice. The crucial element in progressing from a 
securitizing move into an act of securitization lay in the ability of securitizing actors to 
influence targeted audiences into accepting specific issues as existential threats (Barry 
Buzan et al., 1998; McDonald, 2008). The audience is crucial in this aspect, as without 
their consent of the securitizing move, or their rejection of it, an act of securitization can 
be difficult to legitimise and justify. 
Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998) argue that securitization is to study ‘the power politics 
of a concept’, where securitization studies aims to gain an ‘understanding of who 
securitizes (actors), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with 
what results, and, not least, under what conditions’ (Figure 3).  They also note the 
power of social contexts and ‘facilitating conditions’ that can potentially determine the 
success of a securitizing move. These ‘facilitating conditions’ are divided into internal 
and external elements that either facilitate or hinder an act of securitization. The internal 
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element relates to the role of the grammar of security in following the speech act, 
whereas the external elements relates to the social conditions that give a securitising 
actor a position of authority, and the nature of the threat that can either be perceived as 






Figure 3: Process of Securitization 
However it has been argued (Balzacq, 2005: Stritzel, 2007) that the CSSS framework 
for analysis is lacking in its ability to analyse the contextual environment of 
securitization acts, placing too much emphasis on speech acts and neglecting the 
external social context within which acts of securitization occur. Balzacq (2005) argues 
that securitization occurs within a ‘configuration of circumstances, including the 
context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker 
and listener bring to the interaction’. Stritzel (2007) further states that the CSSS 
framework for analysis ‘refuses to conceptualize securitizing speech acts and 
securitizing actors as embedded in broader social and linguistic structures'. Alker (2006) 
and McDonald (2008) go further, arguing that the analysis of securitization and 
desecuritization should take into account the historical context of the society involved, 
and seek to understand why such historical contexts resonate within particular 
constituencies. Whereas the CSSS takes an internalist position and argues that speech 
acts modify their contextual environment, their critics argued from an externalist 
position whereby security language, discourse and narratives have to engage the wider 
social and historical context within which they occur in order to influence targeted 
audiences (Balzacq, 2005).  
Thus while the securitization framework for analysis proposed by Buzan, Waever and 
















securitization and desecuritization through the internalist elements of ‘facilitating 
conditions’, further analysis of the externalist elements is needed to determine the wider 
influential power of the ambiguous language and discourse through the given context of 
a specific securitization scenario. By integrating the analysis of both the internal and 
external ‘facilitating conditions’ of securitization or desecuritization acts, the influential 
power of ambiguous language, discourse and action can be understood from a much 
more holistic perspective, and strengthen the original CSSS literature in relation to how 
a specific context can have greater influence on a targeted audience (McDonald, 2008). 
Stritzel (2007) proposes such an analytical framework of analysis from an externalist 
perspective, which focuses on the forces of ‘the performative force of articulated threat 
texts, their embeddedness in existing discourses, and the positional power of actors who 
influence the process of defining meaning’ (Figure 4). Such a framework takes into 
account the historical and social context of a society where an act of securitization may 
occur, and argues that this context influences the performative force of threat texts, the 
positional power of securitizing actors, and thus the securitizing language and 
discourses ability to influence targeted audiences. Therefore in analysing Russian 
strategic ambiguity as a tactic for desecuritization, both frameworks for analysis serve 
the purpose of identifying the influential power of strategic ambiguity, from both the 







                          Figure 4: Stritzel’s (2007) framework for securitization 
Whereas the CSSS concept of securitization has been well established as a 
constructivist research framework for analysis, one of its other foundational concepts, 
















consolidation in regards to its conceptual framework (Aradau, 2004; Hansen, 2012; 
Taureck, 2006). 
Desecuritization as a framework for analysis has often been considered as a conceptual 
twin of securitization, which operates to bring a securitized issue back from the realm of 
emergency politics and means of resolution to return to normal politics and 
politicization (Hansen, 2012; Aradau, 2004; Taurek, 2006). A desecuritizing actor 
argues to influence a targeted audience that either there is no threat, the threat is not 
what has been argued, or that the proposed threat is non-threatening and can be 
managed within the realm of normal politics (Salter, 2008). Huysmans (1998) argues 
that desecuritization is about the unmaking of constructed threats that are 
institutionalised as perceived public problems. However as Waever (1995) shows, 
desecuritization can also be achieved through preventing the emergence of perceived 
threats, by either maintaining problems below a certain threshold or creating a 
securitizing speech act failure, desecuritizing potential acts of securitization before they 
are institutionalised. From this perspective, desecuritization, rather than simply being 
seen as the conceptual twin to securitization, can be seen as its opposing mechanism, 
which aims to oppose the greater process of securitization by rejecting the legitimisation 
and justification of perceived threats within a given threat defence sequence.  
 An actor can also engage in alternative securitizations that have a desecuritizing effect, 
such as counter securitization, where a given threat can be eclipsed or replaced by the 
importance of another (Santos, 2010). Watson (2009) defines counter securitization as 
‘where societal or political elites identify another referent object as threatened, either by 
the emergency measures implemented by the security provider to counter act the initial 
threat, or by some other development’. In highly politicized conflict environments 
where distinctly opposing positions are held by elites, counter securitization emerges 
when an opposing securitization actor seeks to influence the securitized audiences of the 
other that another threat poses the greater threat, to either create internal opposition 
amongst audiences who may not agree with the act of securitization, or to replace the 
initial threat of an act of securitization in order to desecuritize a specific issue. 
 Aradau (2004) also argues that desecuritization is also about the questioning of 
conventional narratives that are held as a ‘regime of truth’, whereby the construction, 
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legitimization and justification of desecuritizing narratives to meet strategic objectives 
are just as important as a return to the normalisation of politics (Jasper, 2013, p. 195; 
Balzacq, 2014, p. 85). Thus by unmaking, opposing, replacing, or preventing the 
emergence of these perceived threats, desecuritization must be able to influence both the 
public and political cognitive psyche in order to return a specific issue from emergency 
politics back into the realm of normal politics, politicization and public debate. 
Much of the current research into the strategies of desecuritization has focused on the 
social theories of constructivism, deconstructivism and objectivist approaches and how 
these are applied within either a more moderate management or more assertive 
transformative way of desecuritizing (Balzacq, 2014, pp. 104- 109; Huysmans, 1995). 
According to Hansen (2012), there are four distinct strategies in the process of 
desecuritization; Change through stabilisation that takes a constructivist approach in 
which the opposing parties of a conflict recognise each other as legitimate and slowly 
move the language and discourse surrounding a specific event out of the realm of 
security, replacement that takes a constructivist approach and replaces one threat with 
another, rearticulation which takes a deconstructivist approach and casts specific issues 
in new terms, and silencing which also takes a deconstructivist approach and seeks to 
desecuritize by avoiding the use of security based language and discourse to either keep 
an issue out of or remove it from the process of securitization (Hansen, 2012; Balzacq 
2014, pp. 104-109). Yet little attention has been paid to how the construction of 
linguistic communication strategies, such as strategic ambiguity, can be used in order to 
influence the desecuritization process within these social theories. Little is known about 
the ability of the strategic use of language to serve as a tactic for desecuritization. This 
is highlighted by Stritzel (2007), who argues that too little attention is paid in 
securitization studies to the relationship between securitizing actors and their audiences, 
and how the performative utterances of their speech acts are able to create meaning and 
a reality that can successfully engage and influence their audiences. Strategy ambiguity 
holds many advantages over clear communications in given situations (Eisenberg, 
1984). As such its use could prove to be an important tactic in influencing the success of 




2. Conceptualisation and Methodology 
 
 
In this chapter, the research methodology, questions, data and structure of this empirical 
research is explained. Firstly, the main research questions, framework, and case study 
are explained, followed by their conceptualisation and operationalization. Then the 
research methodology that is used in this empirical research is also explained. 
 
2.1. Research question and case selection 
As was established in the previous chapter, the use of strategic ambiguity, implemented 
through information, language and discourse using IAPW and strategic communications 
has the ability to serve as an important tactic of desecuritization by influencing the 
perceptions and BABE’s of targeted audiences. The ability to be able to delegitimise 
and dejustify the process of securitization to targeted audiences, including decision 
makers and their decision making processes, can potentially determine a securitizing 
actors ability to either act on or react to perceived threats.  
Strategic ambiguity and AW have been cited by NATO officials as a clear danger to 
European security, and a change in how Russia is conducting its warfare operations in 
relation to 21st century tactics and strategies, particularly through its use of IAPW and 
strategic communications. In order to combat this threat, NATO needs to develop the 
appropriate tactics, doctrine and policies in order to confirm they are capable of 
ensuring their own security from such a potential threat.  By understanding how Russia 
has used the strategy of strategic ambiguity against NATO in its attempt to influence 
and desecuritize NATO actors and their actions, NATO can be much better equipped 
with the appropriate knowledge as to how to defend itself against this threat if it were to 
occur again in the future or against a NATO member state. Thus in regards to Russia’s 
conflict with Ukraine, two questions need to be answered in regards to how Russia has 
used strategic ambiguity; 
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1) How has Russia constructed strategic ambiguity in order to attempt to 
desecuritize NATO’s process of securitization against its actions in Ukraine? 
 
2) How has strategic ambiguity been used to influence targeted audiences in order 
to attempt to desecuritize NATO’s process of securitization in relation to 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine?   
This research aims to answer these questions by analysing the role of strategic 
ambiguity in the relationship between the desecuritizing actor, Russia, and there 
targeted audiences, which consists of both a European and international audience. 
NATO was chosen for this research over Ukraine due to their highly publicised 
securitizing actions towards Russia, the greater threat a potential conflict between 
Russia and the NATO alliance poses on the European continent, and the organisation 
being one of the preferred mediums through which its member states have taken 
securitizing actions. Also, Russia’s desecuritization has a much larger and more 
generalised target than one specific nation. By evaluating and summarizing the results 
of the two research questions, this research aims to answer the following main research 
question; 
 
Research Question:   Can strategic ambiguity be used as a tactic to influence targeted 
audiences for the purpose and process of desecuritization? 
 
2.2. Conceptualisation 
Strategic ambiguity is identified as the purposeful use of ambiguous language and 
discourse that avoids specifics in order to accomplish Russia’s strategic objectives 
(Eisenberg, 1984). Its aim is defined as making decisions acceptable to audiences by 
creating space within which multiple interpretations may emerge by masking 
divergence (Denis, Dompierre, Langley ,& Rouleau, 2011). This research acknowledges 
that strategic ambiguity can take many forms on different levels. Such range can lead to 
most language or text being ambiguous in a given circumstance (Eisenberg, 1984).   In 
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this context, strategic ambiguity is delimited to take three forms. The use of language 
and discourse which may contain multiple meanings for interpretation, the intentional 
lack of clarity and meaning in discourse to avoid certainty around  specific issues 
(Hutchby, 2001; Sneijder & Te Molder, 2005), and also the lack of certainty created 
through action. Therefore strategically ambiguous language and discourse is identified 
by the lack of its binary opposite, clarity. This is seen in the process of communication, 
where the sender of a message can use abstract language or a lack of specific detail for 
the receiver to interpret multiple interpretations, and where the language and discourse 
used by the sender of the message can contain multiple meanings itself, and allows for 
the receiver to make multiple interpretations (Eisenberg, 1984). Thus strategic 
ambiguity resides in both the sender’s intentions, and the receiver’s interpretation. This 
research focuses on identifying and analysing the strategically ambiguous language and 
discourse from Russia during the Ukrainian conflict aimed at desecuritizing NATO’s 
process of securitization against Russia’s actions. As desecuritization continues to lack 
a conceptual framework, for the purposes of this research, it is be defined as ‘the 
management and transformation of issues out of the threat defence sequence into the 
ordinary public sphere’. How this is achieved focuses on the aspects of desecuritization 
aimed at creating a failure of the process and act of securitization, and the replacement 
of threats through counter securitization. 
As desecuritization relies on the ability to influence targeted audiences and populations, 
how strategic ambiguity creates this influence within the processes of desecuritization 
and counter securitization is the exclusive focus of this research. Influence is defined as 
‘the power to direct the thinking or behaviour of others usually indirectly’ (Influence, 
2015). It is achieved through persuasion. Thus by analysing how strategic ambiguity has 
been used to influence European and international audiences, its effectiveness as a tactic 
for desecuritization can be identified, analysed and evaluated.  
  
2.3. Operationalisation 
Through a case study of the Ukrainian conflict, this research focuses on analysing the 
relationship between the desecuritizing actor, Russia, and their targeted European and 
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international audiences. How Russia has constructed the strategy of strategic ambiguity 
in order to oppose NATO securitization against its actions in Ukraine is assessed by 
analysing the strategically ambiguous language, discourse and actions it has used in 
relation to its conflict with Ukraine. This is achieved through using Buzan, Waever and 
Wilde’s (1998) framework for analysis of securitization (Figure 3). The research 
focuses on highlighting the constructed processes of NATO’s act of securitization, 
Russia’s act of securitization, attempted desecuritization and counter securitization. The 
aim of this section is to analyse how the strategically ambiguous language that has been 
used by Russia has been constructed for the purposes of desecuritization in order to 
influence its targeted audiences.  
Russia’s counter securitization is also analysed to determine the performative force and 
positional power of its strategically ambiguous counter threat and its related context. 
This is achieved by expanding upon the framework for analysis proposed by Buzan, 
Waever and Wilde’s (1998) to incorporate Stritzel’s (2007) proposed framework for the 
analysis of securitization. According to Stritzel (2007), this framework understands 
power as; 
‘the relatedness of  the existing discourse, constituting the performative power and the 
meanings of security articulations, and the positional power of actors, influencing the 
process of defining meaning by enacting particular threat texts and/or shaping the 
existing discursive context. Conversely, the performative force of a threat text can help 
constitute or change existing discourse coalitions and/or change an existing discourse, 
thereby reconfiguring existing relations of power. Influencing the process of defining 
meaning is always marked by acts of translation of a certain threat text into an existing 
discourse. The better the compatibility of the articulated text/textual structure and the 
existing discourse (i.e. its 'resonance') and the better the positional power of securitizing 
actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant 
narrative for a larger collective’. (Stritzel, 2007)  
Thus Stritzel’s (2007) framework for securitization serves as a better model to analyse 
how strategic ambiguity has been constructed in order to influence and desecuritize 
through Russia’s counter securitization, as it takes into account how the discursive 
context of securitizing or desecuritizing discourse can affect both the performative 
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power of articulated threats and the positional power of securitizing actors in a specific 
context, which contributes to influencing the targeted audiences BABE’s and 
perceptions. Thus the aim of the analysis of Russia’s counter securitization is to 
determine the influential positional and threat articulation power it creates through 
relating its language and discourse to a specific context. 
In the selection of data sources to be used for this analysis, stakeholder sampling is the 
chosen method as it involves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are 
involved in the processes of securitization and desecuritization and how these processes 
may affect one another (Given, 2008, pp. 698-699).  The data to be used in this research 
is selected from official NATO and Russian government speeches and transcripts. For 
the purposes of this article, these speeches and transcripts have taken place in the 
specific time frame of the 23rd of February to the 1st of December 2014. The use of data 
sampling from NATO and the Russian government also helps improve the credibility of 
this research by using data from the original sources involved in the processes of 
securitization and desecuritization.  In the selection of text, language and discourse from 
these sources, those that have been identified as strategically ambiguous and related to 
the processes of securitization and desecuritization are used for the analysis.  
In operationalizing strategic ambiguity, as its aim is defined as making decisions 
acceptable to audiences by creating space within which multiple interpretations may 
emerge by masking divergence (Denis, Dompierre, Langley ,& Rouleau, 2011), 
strategic ambiguity is measured by  its ability to foster multiple interpretations of key 
issues at key instances for targeted audiences for the purpose and process of 
desecuritization. An example of this would be NATO’s accusations of Russian military 
aggression in Ukraine, where through both the intentional lack of clarity and meaning in 
Russia’s discourse about its military actions in Ukraine, uncertainty created through 
action, and deniability, multiple interpretations of the situation by the audience may 
emerge, such as the perception that the Russian military is involved in the conflict, is 
not, or prevailing uncertainty. 
As desecuritization can take many forms on different levels, for the purposes of this 
research, the degree of desecuritization is operationalized through a chain of 
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measurement proposed by Salter (2008), which focuses on the degree to which policies 
and opinions accords with the process of securitization; 
- To what degree is the issue-area discussed as part of a wider political debate? 
- Is the description of the threat as existential accepted or rejected? 
- Is the solution accepted or rejected? 
- Are new or emergency powers accorded to the securitizing agent? 
By analysing the degree of success within the process of securitization through policy 
and public opinion, the degree and success of an attempted desecuritization can also be 
determined. The measurement of desecuritization is achieved by focusing on current 
political discourse within NATO member states, the accordance of new or emergency 
powers, and public perceptions about the Ukrainian conflict in the countries of Germany 
and Poland, using empirical research by Poland’s Institute of Public Affairs 
(Kucharczyk, 2015).  
 
2.4. Methodology 
The methodology that is used is that of critical discourse analysis. According to Van 
Dijk (2001), critical discourse analysis is ‘a type of discourse analytical research that 
primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’. Fairclough 
(1995, p.132) defines it as ‘discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore 
often opaque relationships of causality and determination between discursive practices, 
events and texts, and wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to 
investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically 
shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity 
of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and 
hegemony’. He also argues that ‘critical implies showing connections and causes that 
are hidden’ (Fairclough, 1992, p.9). Discourse analysis has been chosen as it follows the 
notion in constructivist security studies that securitization is achieved through speech 
acts. As Balzacq states (2005), discourse analysis alone is ineffective in its ability to 
identify and analyse either the success or failure of a securitization or desecuritization 
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act, as it overlooks the power of context in its ability to create influence, and change 
either the performative power of text, or the positional power of a securitizing or a 
desecuritizing actor (Stritzel, 2007). However critical discourse analysis sees the use of 
language as a form of social practice, where the origins of social practices are embedded 
in specific historical contexts, and are the means through which current social practices 
are reproduced to serve the interests of competing powers (Janks, 1997). Breeze (2013) 
argues that critical discourse analysis comprises of two key components; a political 
problem with the function of power and ideology in society, and how language reveals, 
contributes to and perpetuates this function. Thus critical discourse analysis can be seen 
as the analysis of the relationship between language and power (Weiss & Wodak, 
2002). 
Fairclough (1995, p.57) proposes a three dimensional interrelated framework for critical 
discourse analysis, which focuses on three distinct levels, using three different kinds of 
analysis; 
- The object of analysis – analysis of language texts (description). 
- The process by which the object is produced and received by audiences – 
processing analysis (interpretation). 
- The socio historical context which directs these processes – social analysis 
(explanation) (Janks, 1997). 
Fairclough’s (1995) framework focuses on analysing the text and its discursive practice, 
its communication, and also the socio cultural environment and its relatedness to 
historical context. Van Dijk (2001) further highlights how critical discourse analysis can 
be used to focus on how discursive structures influence mental perceptions, stating that 
‘such discursive influence may be due to context as well as to the structures of text and 
talk themselves’. Thus due to the function of critical discourse analysis focusing not 
only on the text, but also its related context, and how these factors can shape mental 
perceptions, it is a suitable method for the purposes of this research. Therefore the 
framework of the methodology for this research uses Fairclough’s (1995, p.57) three 




3. Securitization and desecuritization during the Ukrainian conflict 
 
 
In this chapter, how NATO has securitized its relations with Russia over their actions in 
Ukraine, and also how Russia has constructed its strategically ambiguous language and 
discourse through desecuritization, securitization and counter securitization in order to 
attempt to desecuritize NATO’s position  is identified, explained and analysed. The aim 
of this chapter is to highlight how Russia has used strategically ambiguous language and 
discourse in relation to its actions or alleged actions in its conflict with Ukraine, in order 
to attempt to influence targeted audiences and desecuritize NATO’s position of 
securitization. This analysis takes place within both Buzan, Waever and Wilde’s (1998), 
and Stritzel’s (2007) frameworks for the analysis of securitization. It is divided into four 
sections. Initially, how the process of securitization is constructed by NATO is 
explained, followed by the analysis of the use of strategic ambiguity in Russia’s 
attempted desecuritization. Then how Russia has constructed its process of 
securitization is explained and analysed, followed by how Russia has constructed 
strategic ambiguity in its counter securitization in order to influence against NATO 
securitization.  
 
3.1. NATO securitization 
Following the ouster of the former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych’s 
government, the events occurring in Ukraine were cited by NATO as Europe’s most 
important security issue (NATO, 2014, February 26th). The instability created by the 
government overthrow left a power vacuum in the country, ripe of competing ideals 
largely between Western and Eastern Ukraine in regards to the future direction of the 
country. The refusal by former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych to sign the 
European Union’s association agreement, in favour of closer relations and the 
possibility of joining the Russian led Customs and Eurasian Economic Union, 
highlights the competing political, economic, cultural, and ideological division in the 
country of where its people see their future. Such a power vacuum, fostered by division 
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and instability, had made Ukraine a favourable environment for the use of IPAW and 
strategic communications by the competing powers of NATO and Russia, in order to 
influence the local, regional and international populations to subscribe to their specific 
viewpoints, interpretations and narratives of the conflict. However the construction of 
NATO’s securitization didn’t occur until the subsequent events that unfolded in Crimea.  
On the 26th of February 2014, unidentifiable armed men, wearing military style 
uniforms with military grade weapons, without national emblems or insignias began to 
occupy key military, political and critical infrastructure within the Crimean peninsula. 
Their actions would go on to destabilize the peninsula, before the hasty and 
questionable March 16th Crimean referendum would see the political status of the 
peninsula move towards independence and joining the Russian Federation. During this 
crisis, NATO began to develop its securitization threat, initially stating, and then 
developing its securitizing speech acts and move; 
‘I have convened the North Atlantic Council today because of Russia’s military action 
in Ukraine, and because of President Putin’s threats against this sovereign nation.’ 
(NATO, 2014, March 2nd). 
‘Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is in blatant breach of its international 
commitments and it is a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ 
(NATO, 2014, March 19th) 
‘Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine is the most serious crisis in Europe since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  Our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace has been put 
into question.’ (NATO, 2014, March 21st) 
‘Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine is the most serious crisis in Europe since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.’ (NATO, 2014, April 11th) 
The progression of Russia’s military threat from that of ‘action’, to ‘aggression’ and 
then ‘intervention’, highlights the escalation of NATO’s securitization language in 
relation to its progression from a speech act to an act of securitization. From this 
discourse, the beginnings of the development of a referent takes place, with NATO 
focusing on the threat posed by the Russian military to Europe, bringing the future of 
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European security ‘into question’. This referent would also expand to include a 
challenge to ‘Euro Atlantic security’ (NATO, 2014, March 19th) and a threat to ‘an 
open, rules-based international system, a system based on respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all states’ (NATO, 2014, April 4th). Thus the securitization of 
Russia as a military threat, is not only perceived as one as a threat to European security, 
but also as one to the hegemonic normative influence of the West based on 
interpretations of international norms. This is highlighted in NATO’s discourse, where 
it is stated; 
‘President Putin and his government have shown complete contempt for international 
law, for international order, and for international institutions.  Russia’s recent actions in 
Ukraine are outrageous.  They are irresponsible, they are illegal, they are illegitimate.’ 
(NATO, 2014, May 9th). 
From NATO’s threat and its referent in its attempted securitization, two targeted 
audiences can be identified; A European audience, through which NATO attempts to 
legitimise and justify a Russian military threat, and an international one, from which 
this threat is threatening ‘an open, rules-based international system’. NATO uses 
historical references to elevate the perception of the Russian military threat, with the use 
of such historical terms and references as ‘since the end of the cold war’(NATO, 2014, 
March 19th), ‘change the borders of Europe’(NATO, 204, April 30th), ‘the fall of the 
Berlin wall’(NATO, 2014, April 11th), ‘since the end of  World War Two’(NATO, 
2014, September 4th), and the ‘greatest challenge to Europe’s security in a 
generation’(NATO, 2014, April 8th)  used to describe it. Such historical references also 
serve to justify and legitimise this threat, by invigorating the collective memory of the 
threat and tyranny posed by the Soviet Union’s occupation of Europe in order to 
mobilise the civilian populace into collective action. As it has been argued (Harris, 
2006; Hom & Yamamoto, 1999; Steinberg, 1998), the use of narratives of historical 
injustices and shared painful collective memories, such as that as the military 
occupation of Europe by the Soviet Union, are more capable of stimulating collective 
action than those that simply focus on Russia’s current actions. Thus the use of 
historical references to engage the collective memories of the civilian populace can be 
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seen as a tactic in order to influence and mobilise greater collective action and support 
for an act of securitization. 
In its act of securitization, NATO has moved towards the enacting of the extraordinary 
measure of the suspension of NATO and Russian relations, and supporting wider EU 
and US sanctions. As Ramussen states; 
‘there can be no business as usual. So today, we are suspending all practical cooperation 
with Russia, military and civilian. In the NATO-Russia Council, the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, and the Partnership for Peace.’ (NATO, 2014, April 1st)  
‘I firmly believe that the international community must respond determinedly if Russia 
were to intervene further in Ukraine; respond through deeper, broader, tougher 
economic sanctions’ (NATO, 2014, September 4th) 
While economic sanctions have been implemented by the EU and US, NATO’s function 
as an intergovernmental security alliance within these political unions places it in a 
position to support, recommend and encourage such measures. NATO’s suspension of 
NATO Russian relations can be considered an extraordinary measure in securitizing 
against a Russian military threat, with NATO’s actions focusing on maintaining a 
‘continuous presence and activity in the air, on land and at sea in the Eastern part of the 
Alliance, on a rotational basis’ (NATO, 2014, September 5th).  With a ‘continuous 
presence’ on a ‘rotational basis’ in Poland and the Baltic states, it pushes the boundaries 
of the NATO Russia Founding Act as to what can be considered the permanent basing 
of substantial combat forces in Eastern Europe (NATO, 1997). Also, the reframing of 
Russia as an ‘adversary’ from that of a ‘partner’ also brings this act into question 
(NATO, 2014, April 4th). However the notion of NATO taking a ‘there can be no 
business as usual’ stance highlights a stance by NATO that could also be considered as 
extraordinary. By no ‘business as usual’, the combination of the suspension of NATO 
Russian relations, support for economic sanctions, and changing the perception of 
Russia from that of a partner to that of a threat, NATO takes the position that normal 
relations with Russia cannot continue due to the threat its actions in Ukraine poses, and 
strategically seeks to isolate Russia both politically and economically. Such a position 
as a ‘no business as usual’ strategic approach can be considered an extraordinary 
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measure, as the position would be difficult to achieve in normal politics without a 
securitized threat that required it. 
Thus in order to desecuritize NATO’s position of securitization against its actions in 
Ukraine, Russia needs to reduce the perception of its military as a threat to European 
audiences, threatening ‘an open, rules-based international system’ to international 
audiences, in order to move the extraordinary measures of the suspension of NATO 
Russian relations, its actions of a ‘continuous presence’ on a ‘rotational basis’ in Poland 
and the Baltics, and a ‘no business as usual’ political and economic strategic approach, 
out of a threat defence sequence and back into the realm of normal politics, and back to 
business as usual. 
 
3.2 Russian desecuritization 
Whereas NATO supported the new government after the popular overthrow of the 
leadership of Ukraine, Russia has maintained the position of opposition, with Putin 
stating; 
‘First of all, my assessment of what happened in Kiev and in Ukraine in general. There 
can only be one assessment: this was an anti-constitutional takeover, an armed seizure 
of power.’ (Kremlin, 2014, March 4th) 
The Russian view of the new Ukrainian leadership as one that is illegitimate is 
supported by its continued stance of ambiguity after the election of the new president 
Petro Poroschenko, refusing to either deny or confirm its stance of officially recognising 
Ukraine’s new leadership. When questioned whether he regards Petro Poroschenko as 
the legitimate president of Ukraine, Putin states; 
‘I’ve already told you and will say it again: we will respect the choice of the Ukrainian 
people and we will cooperate with Ukrainian authorities.’(Kremlin, 2014, June 4th) 
This statement lacks clarity. Putin refuses to mention either Petro Poroschenko, or the 
Ukrainian government, or whether he recognises the legitimacy of either. Rather he uses 
such terms as ‘respect’ for the choice made by people in Ukraine, and to simply 
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‘cooperate’ not with the government, but rather ‘authorities’. This position refuses to 
either confirm or deny the recognition and legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and 
is strategically ambiguous. It lacks both clarity and meaning in sending the message to 
an international audience as to whether the Russian government does, or does not 
recognise the current leadership. By taking two different positions, in regards to the 
Ukrainian ‘people’, and the Ukrainian ‘authorities’, such a statement could be 
interpreted that Russia will ‘respect’ Ukrainian separatists and ‘cooperate’ with them 
should they become the new ‘authorities’ in their respective regions against the wishes 
of the Ukrainian government.  
Through its use of strategic ambiguity, Russia preserves both its privileged position and 
its future options in the conflict (Eisenberg, 1984), allowing it to manipulate the 
potential outcome by choosing the degree to which it cooperates with the Ukrainian 
‘authorities’ and individuals whose ‘choice’ is separatism in the country without having 
to commit to one or the other.  This gives Russia further time to implement its 
asymmetric and AW tactics in order to attempt to delegitimise and undermine the 
Ukrainian government’s authority, break the integrity of the state, and to justify their 
position of support for separatists who are fighting the Ukrainian leadership. This is key 
in Russia’s process of desecuritization, whereby its ability to delegitimize the Ukrainian 
leadership, aids the perception that its military actions are not a threat to ‘an open, rules-
based international system’, as they came to power against the rules of such a system.  
If Russia were to confirm or deny its recognition of the Ukrainian leadership, its 
audience’s would be put into the position of where their interpretation of it would be 
influenced by either seeing it as legitimate, or as Russia not recognising a 
democratically elected leadership.  
 Russia is also able to maintain the existing impression that the Ukrainian leadership is 
illegitimate within its international audience (Eisenberg, 1984). As Manis (1961, p.76) 
states, ‘interpreting an ambiguous statement or opinion, the average person would be 
more strikingly influenced by his own views than he would be when interpreting a non-
ambiguous statement’. Therefore Russia’s position that the Ukrainian leadership is 
illegitimate is able to be maintained within the perceptions of its international audience 
that believe it is illegitimate, by neither confirming nor denying their recognition of it 
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(Figure 5). This allows their international audiences to make decisions most consistent 
with their own beliefs and to make their own inferences. Their audiences beliefs are 
reinforced by Russia’s continued use of IAPW, where the use of language such as 
‘Kiev’ and ‘authorities’ rather than ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘government’ continue to insinuate 
the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian leadership (RT, 2014, September 30th).  Thus through 
the use of strategic ambiguity, Russia’s international audiences who have already been 
influenced by their IAPW to believe the Ukraine government are illegitimate, are also 
influenced to maintain such a position through Russia’s ambiguous stance in regards to 
the legitimacy of the Ukrainian leadership after the presidential election of Petro 
Poroschenko.     
 
Strategic ambiguity 1: Is the Ukrainian government legitimate? 
The Ukrainian 
government is legitimate. 
Uncertain. The Ukrainian 
government is illegitimate. 
Figure 5: Strategic ambiguity maintains existing impressions (Eisenberg, 1984) 
 
Strategic ambiguity is also visible in regards to NATO’s securitized threat of the 
‘Russian military’. Whereas NATO has securitized against a Russian military threat, the 
use of discourse, AW and the strategic concealment of its forces as highlighted by 
Gerasimov (2013) has created ambiguity in regards to whether the Russian military is 
involved in the conflict or to what degree they are involved. Without visible evidence of 
either Russian soldiers, or a military build-up on Ukraine’s border, it makes it 
increasingly difficult to determine the difference between soldiers disguised as civilians 
and civilians themselves, and whether the possibility of a Russian military invasion in 
Ukraine actually exists. This ambiguity created through action, is supplemented by 
Russia’s use of strategic ambiguity in its discourse. After being questioned about 
Russia’s military action in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Putin has responded; 
‘Those were local self-defence units.’ (Kremlin, 2014, March 4th). 
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‘Russia did not annex Crimea by force. Russia created conditions – with the help of 
special armed groups and the Armed Forces’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 17th) 
‘Nonsense. There are no Russian units in eastern Ukraine – no special services, no 
tactical advisors. All this is being done by the local residents’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 
17th) 
These statements in regards to the presence of the Russian military in Ukraine lack 
clarity. Initially Putin denies Russian military involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, 
before stating that ‘the armed forces’ aided Russia in creating ‘conditions’ for the events 
in Crimea to occur, then in regards to the conflict in the East of Ukraine, once again 
denied any involvement in the conflict, claiming them to be ‘local residents’. Thus 
strategic ambiguity in regards to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine takes two 
forms. Ambiguity created through the concealment of Russia’s forces, and ambiguity 
created through the lack of clarity in Russia’s discourse about their involvement, and 
their degree of involvement in the conflict. In this case, Russia creates space within the 
minds of its European audiences from which multiple interpretations about the degree 
of Russia’s military involvement in the conflict can emerge (Figure 6). 
 
Strategic ambiguity 2: Is the Russian military involved in the conflict? 
The Russian military is 
involved in the conflict. 
Uncertain The Russian military isn’t 
involved in the conflict. 
Figure 6: Strategic ambiguity allows deniability (Eisenberg, 1984) 
 
Without the clear visibility of Russian troops or a Russian military build-up on the 
Ukrainian border, strategic ambiguity allows Russia to engage in semi credible 
deniability (Eisenberg, 1984) due to the inability to decisively prove their military 
presence, which is masked through their concealment.  Through the denial of their 
involvement, Russia is able to deny they are a military threat in its process of 
desecuritization, while its support for ‘local’ separatist movements in the country can 
continue, attempting to achieve favourable outcomes for the Kremlin upon the conflicts 
resolution.  Its rejection of responsibility for the conflict also ensures that Russia can act 
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both as an aggressor, and a mediator between the Ukrainian government and pro-
Russian separatist forces. 
The denial of Russian troops in Ukraine through strategic ambiguity, and argument that 
they are ‘local self-defence units’, takes a distinct relativist approach in Russia’s 
communication (Eisenberg, 1984), where NATO’s securitizing threat, and Russia’s 
denial and rearticulation of it, is based upon a battle of subjective perceptions, where the 
mixing of and inability to identify concealed Russian troops with separatist civilians, 
allows audiences to subjectively determine themselves what is truth, whether they 
believe the forces on the ground are Russian troops or ‘local residents’ based on their 
own BABE’s. 
Russia’s combined use of strategic ambiguity with visual communications of images is 
paramount in regards to its ability to influence the perceptions of its European audiences 
that forces on the ground are local separatist fighters. As research suggests, the 
combined use of both oral and visual communication in communicating a message has 
greater influence on an audience’s perceptions than an oral message alone (Lester, 
2006). In conflict scenarios, there is a strong desire not to communicate images of 
civilian casualties which may negatively affect a securitized actor’s position. Such 
desires challenge the notion in securitization studies that speech acts are the only key 
form of communication, particularly considering when the majority of political 
communication is embedded within media imagery (Williams, 2003). Russia’s use of 
concealment and strategic ambiguity not only denies NATO the powerful visual image 
of Russian soldiers in articulating their Russian military threat, but also gives Russia the 
opportunity to communicate images of suffering civilians and local separatists in 
denying this threat, as well as the perceived threat they face from ideological extremists 
(RT, 2014, May 3rd). The combining of strategically ambiguous discourse and visual 
communication in this regard, gives Russia greater communicative influence on its 
European audiences to persuade them that they are not a threat. 
The maintenance  of the perception of the Ukrainian leadership as illegitimate and the 
denial of the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine through the use of strategic 
ambiguity, aims to create a failure of NATO’s act of securitization by fostering multiple 
interpretations and weakening the perception of the Russian military as a threat to an ‘an 
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open, rules-based international system’. The fostering of multiple interpretations and 
weakening of these perceptions lays the foundations for the reinterpretation of NATO’s 
act of securitization. As Smith, Atkin and Roznowski (2006) highlight, a desecuritizing 
actors use of strategically ambiguous messages that lack clarity, creates interpretational 
diversity from which multiple interpretations of the conflict may occur, and aids the 
facilitation of inference making by audiences who determine the meaning of messages 
based on their own BABE’s. Thus through the use of strategic ambiguity concerning the 
legitimacy of the Ukrainian leadership and Russia’s military involvement in the 
conflict, Russia is able to improve its delegitimization and rearticulation (Hansen, 2012) 
of NATO’s act of securitization to an audience that is more diverse in their 
interpretation of the conflict, and more likely to listen to and subscribe to Russia’s 
interpretation. 
 
3.3. Russian securitization 
In seeking to deligitmise and dejustify NATO’s act of securitization, Russia focuses on 
relativizing the notion that its position in the Ukrainian crisis is not as threatening as 
perceived (Rumelili, 2014, p.156). This is not achieved through the desecuritization of 
European and international audiences alone, but through the construction of strategic 
ambiguity within Russia’s own act of securitization to have a desecuritizing effect. In 
these alternative securitizations by NATO and Russia, a struggle for information 
superiority ensues over the interpretation of threats and referents in order to justify and 
legitimise each other’s position. As Putin states; 
‘If the current regime in Kiev really did use armed force against the country’s 
population, this is undoubtedly a serious crime against the people … If the current rulers 
in Kiev have done it, this turns them into a sort of junta, a clique. First of all, they do 
not have a national mandate to do it. At best, they have some elements of legitimacy, 
and only in parliament. All the other authorities are illegitimate for one reason or 
another.’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 24th) 
‘those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were 
preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop 
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short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, 
Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in 
Ukraine to this day.’ (Kremlin, 2014, March 18th) 
‘we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s 
accomplice during World War II.’ (Kremlin, 2014, March 18th) 
By referring to the Ukrainian government as the ‘regime’, ‘rulers’, ‘junta’ and 
‘authorities’ in ‘Kiev’, Russia seeks to express their position to their Russian audiences 
that the Ukrainian leadership is lacking in legitimacy and authority, the conflict is a civil 
one, and that the leadership of the government are a localised installed coup that don’t 
represent the remainder of Ukraine. It also assists in conveying the message that the 
government should not be recognised, but rather isolated, and seen as a non-
representative figure of the wider nation, and one that doesn’t conform with the 
international norms of governance. By associating the Ukrainian government with 
‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’ who have fascist ‘intentions’ 
who are backed by the US and the West, Russia attempts to stigmatize and relativize the 
Ukrainian leadership as one that is similar to the historical threat faced by Russia and 
Europe during World War Two. Putin continues; 
‘I will state clearly - if the Crimean local self-defence units had not taken the situation 
under control, there could have been casualties as well.’ (Kremlin, March 18th) 
‘The most obvious risk was that the Russian speaking population was threatened and 
that the threats were absolutely specific and tangible.’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 17th) 
‘But we also thought, and have always hoped, that all native Russians, the Russian-
speaking people living in Ukraine, would live in a comfortable political environment, 
that they would not be threatened or oppressed.’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 17th) 
By arguing that ‘local self-defence units’ had prevented ‘casualties’, Russia’s 
securitization over the Ukrainian conflict frames the threat of an ‘illegitimate’ ‘junta’ 
backed by ‘nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’, the US and the 
west, who are a threat to ‘all native Russians, the Russian-speaking people living in 
Ukraine’. There act of securitization is enacted by authorizing the extraordinary 
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measure of Russian military force in Ukraine (REF/RL, 2014, March 1st). By attempting 
to legitimize and justify their own act of securitization, Russia also seeks to influence 
European and international audiences to delegitimize and dejustify NATO’s act of 
securitization by getting them to subscribe to their own narrative in their securitization 
over the Ukrainian conflict and achieve information superiority. Putin continues; 
‘the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our 
western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they 
agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is 
doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central 
authorities. Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter, the UN 
International Court agreed with this approach and made the following comment in its 
ruling of July 22, 2010, and I quote: “No general prohibition may be inferred from the 
practice of the Security Council with regard to declarations of independence,” and 
“General international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” 
Crystal clear, as they say.’ (Kremlin, 2014, March 18th). 
The argument that Kosovo’s independence sets a ‘precedent’ is used by both Crimea 
and Russia, to argue that its position in the crisis is not threatening and is ‘exactly what 
Crimea’ is doing now. It follows ‘a precedent our western colleagues created with their 
own hands in a very similar situation’ and is ‘Pursuant to Article 2, Chapter 1 of the 
United Nations Charter’. Russia seeks to relativize and identify its position in the 
Ukrainian conflict as similar to the position of NATO during the Kosovo war and its 
subsequent independence, whereby an illegitimate ‘junta’ is threatening ‘the Russian 
speaking population’ and ‘local defense units’ who are seeking independence. Such a 
position, aided by Russia’s strategically ambiguous attempted delegitimization of the 
Ukrainian leadership, and denial and rearticulation of NATO’s constructed Russian 
military threat to create interpretational diversity, is aimed at normalising Russia’s 
actions and support for separatists in Ukraine in the perceptions of its Russian and 
international audiences, as those that are in line with both the previous actions of NATO 
in Kosovo and precedent in international law. This downplays the notion of the Russian 
military as a threat to an ‘an open, rules-based international system’ and seeks to justify 
and legitimize Russia’s position. Russian IAPW uses this relativisation in an attempt to 
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dejustify and delegitimise NATO’s act of securitization, framing it as a hypocritical and 
aggressive actor and accusing it of advocating such actions based on precedent (RT, 
2014, March 21st).  
Thus Russia’s use of strategic ambiguity in its act of securitization aims to create a 
failure of NATO’s act of securitization, by delegitimizing the Ukrainian leadership and 
maintaining such an impression amongst its Russian and international audiences, and 
denying its military is a threat, rearticulating them as ‘local defence units’ to its 
European and Russian audiences, while it relativizes the Ukrainian leadership with a 
historical ideological threat, and its actions as those similar to a precedent set by NATO 
in international law in order to justify and legitimize its own act of securitization. In this 
sense, it can be argued that strategic ambiguity has been used to construct a 
purposefully desecuritizing Russian securitization, whereby the use of strategic 
ambiguity, assists Russia in simultaneously securitizing their own Russian audience and 
desecuritizing European and international audiences. 
 
3.4. Russian counter securitization 
As Watson (2009, p.32) states, in many cases the desecuritization of acts of 
securitization does not only take the form of desecuritization or alternate securitizations, 
but also in the process of ‘counter securitization’, where another threat seeks to either 
eclipse or replace the threat of the another securitizing actor. In cases of intervention, 
such as in Crimea, a securitizing or counter securitizing party will generally appeal on 
the international arena to the referent, such as NATO’s claim to the violation of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and Russia’s claim to the rights of ethnic 
and cultural Russians self-determination (Barry Buzan et al., 1998, p.151). Russia’s 
threat and referent discourse, which expands to include the wider European region in an 
attempt to replace the threat of the Russian military, can be accurately seen as counter 
securitization. 
In its counter securitization to legitimize and justify its actions in Ukraine, Russia has 
focused on an ideological threat to a cultural ethnic based referent, appealing to both 
European and Russian audiences. The use of such terms as ‘Nationalists’, ‘neo-Nazis’, 
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‘Russophobes’ and ‘anti-Semites’ are a clear indication of Russia’s use of terms that 
attempt to engage the historical memories of the European and Russian populations, and 
characterise and elevate the perception of the threat in the context of a continued 
ideological one from World War Two where ‘the ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s 
accomplice’ are a re-emergence of the threat of fascism (Poulsen, 2014). In Russia’s 
counter securitization, both this ideological threat and the referent of ‘all native 
Russians, the Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine’ expand to include wider 
Europe. As Putin states; 
‘When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens I am referring to those people 
who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community, they may not 
necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people.’ (Kremlin, 
2014, July 1st) 
‘Our country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots 
abroad, using the entire range of available means – from political and economic to 
operations under international humanitarian law and the right of self-defence.’(Kremlin, 
2014, July 1st) 
‘Regrettably, in some European countries the Nazi virus “vaccine” created at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal is losing its effect. This is clearly demonstrated by open 
manifestations of neo-Nazism that have already become commonplace in Latvia and 
other Baltic states. The situation in Ukraine, where nationalists and other radical groups 
provoked an anti-constitutional coup d’état in February, causes particular concern in this 
respect. Today, it is our shared duty to combat the glorification of Nazism. (Kremlin, 
2014, October 15th) 
The notion of ideological threats such as ‘nationalists’, ‘neo-Nazis’, ‘Russophobes’, 
‘anti-Semites’ and ‘Nazism’ in Russia’s threat articulation both lacks clarity and 
meaning, due to the threat being largely unidentifiable, allowing Russia to pick and 
choose who it considers a threat. It can include a wide variety of interpretations by 
audiences, due to an individual’s ideological preferences being beholden to change, and 
people holding differing views in regards to what beliefs and actions constitute a given 
ideology. Notions of fascism could be interpreted as conservative individuals, radical 
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groups, states, or as Berzins (2014) states, Western liberalism or ideology itself. Thus 
strategic ambiguity in regards to Russia’s counter securitization threat takes two forms. 
The use of language and discourse which may contain multiple meanings for 
interpretation, and the intentional lack of clarity and meaning in discourse to avoid 
certainty around specific issues. Such ideological threats are important in Russia’s 
threat construction, as they are socially imbedded in both Europe and Russia’s history, 
where the historical context of World War Two and its associated threats carry 
significant influential weight in Europe’s collective memory.  
 
Strategic ambiguity 3: Is the Russian military or ideology the greater threat? 
The Russian military is 
the greater threat. 
Uncertain Ideology is the greater 
threat. 
Figure 7: Strategic ambiguity promotes unified diversity (Eisenberg, 1984) 
 
Russia both expands its securitization threat and referent outside of Russia and Ukraine 
when it states that it considers Russians to be ‘people who consider themselves part of 
the broad Russian community, they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they 
consider themselves Russian people’ and that they will ‘actively defend the rights of 
Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means’. These 
statements insinuate that Russian’s, or those who identify with them are under threat in 
Europe from ‘open manifestations of neo-Nazism’ in the ‘Baltic states’ and ‘some 
European countries’, and its Europe’s ‘shared duty’ to ‘combat the glorification of 
Nazism.’. Such a position highlights Russia’s move from securitization, into that of 
counter securitization, whereby it seeks to replace the threat of its military (Figure 7), 
with that of an ambiguous ideological one revolving around notions of fascism. 
The use of ambiguity and ideology in this regard to characterise the threat towards 
Russia serves a crucial process in its attempted counter securitization. As Kaufmann 
(1996a) states, in civil conflicts, the ability to either conform or influence involved 
populations in a given conflict varies depending on whether or not the conflict is either 
ideologically or ethnic based. He argues that ethnic based conflicts represent a power 
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struggle between different communities that see themselves as having distinct cultural 
heritages and ethnic identities; whereas ideological conflicts are struggles within a 
distinct community about how such a community should be governed.  Thus in 
ideological conflicts, individual loyalties are amorphous, difficult to distinguish among 
the wider population, and are subject to change based on individual ideas and 
preferences in relation to the governing structure. This makes intervention in ideological 
conflicts very difficult, due to the inability to recognise who is the enemy, and having 
no distinct delimiting lines between the two sides of the conflict. This is highlighted by 
NATO’s current concern of how to respond to such a conflict that uses AW and 
ideology, if an article 5 situation were to rise in a NATO member state that was an 
ideologically based conflict. Whereas in ethnic based conflicts, individual loyalties are 
rigid, highly distinguishable and are unlikely to change given an individual’s cultural 
and ethnic background. Therefore in ideological based conflicts, the use of language and 
discourse serve as important weapons as competing sides in the conflict are attempting 
to mobilise, recruit and influence individuals from the same population in order to win 
the hearts and minds of targeted audiences to subscribe to their interpretation of the 
threat and conflict (Kaufmann, 1996b; Lockyer, 2011). As Russia has been able to 
characterise the threat in Ukraine and Europe as ideological, it can be argued that the 
ideological basis of this threat has aided their ability to pre-emptively desecuritize a 
potential NATO intervention in Ukraine by its decision makers, through constructing a 
strategically ambiguous threat in both its securitization and counter securitization. 
Russia’s attempt to characterise ‘those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine’ as 
‘Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites’ backed by the US and the 
West, and the threatened referent as ‘Russians’ and ‘those people who consider 
themselves part of the broad Russian community’, ensures that it is able to maintain a 
maximum amount of influence over Russian ethnic and cultural populations in its 
securitization and counter securitization, while being able to maximise its influence over 
non-Russian ethnic and cultural populations in its counter securitization, by engaging 
and manipulating the BABE’s of European audiences by appealing to their ideological 
preferences of governance. NATO’s constructed securitized threat is the rigid, state 
based and clear threat of Russian military aggression. Thus it can be argued that Russia 
has been more successful in appealing to the ideological BABE’s of its Western 
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European audiences, by using strategic ambiguity and ideology to construct their threat 
to appeal to a diverse range of ideological viewpoints, a variety of individuals from a 
variety of different ideological and political backgrounds who can all be engaged and 
influenced by the promotion of a unified diversity through the use of strategic ambiguity 
(Eisenberg, 1984). Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014) highlight this interpretational 
diversity, where Russian IAPW and strategic communications outlets such as RT, focus 
and target on appealing to the fringes of both sides of politics, conspiracy theorists and 
issue motivated groups, who may consider the European supranational governing 
structure, or as Berzins (2014) argues, the West, Western liberalism, the US, or far right 
wing groups and political organisations, a current problem in Europe, as ‘neo-fascist’ 
(Kremlin, 2014, July 22nd) or ‘Nazis’, allowing individuals to maintain their individual 
interpretations of the threat while believing that others are in agreement with them. By 
relativizing such a threat with the Ukrainian leadership, who are supported by Ukrainian 
radicals, the US, EU and the west, Russia is also able to influence such individuals to 
associate their diverse range of interpretations of the threat in regards to their 
interpretations of the Ukrainian government’s legitimacy. 
The use of such language as ‘neo-fascist’ and ‘Nazism’ to describe Russia’s counter 
securitization threat are key embedded terms and themes in Western Europe’s and 
Russia’s historical collective memory,  which increases the influential power of their 
ability to influence individuals (Lehti, Jutila, & Jokisipilä, 2008). Through their use, 
Russia are able to frame the context of the Ukrainian conflict as one which resembles 
and appeals to Western Europe’s and Russia’s historical BABE’s in relation to World 
War Two, and increase the power of both their articulation and Russia’s positional 
power as a counter securitizing actor, by relativizing such a threat and Russia’s position 
in regards to the Ukrainian conflict in both historical and current social contexts. As 
Putin highlights when he states ‘in some European countries the Nazi virus “vaccine” 
created at the Nuremberg Tribunal is losing its effect’, this historical context and threat 
articulation serves as both a naturally opposed threat, and facilitator for Western 
European desecuritization.  
Whereas Western European accounts of World War Two have focused on the collective 
mourning for the victims of the Holocaust where virulent nationalism is portrayed as a 
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threat and post nationalism is favoured, Eastern European accounts of the war have 
focused on the atrocities that were committed against their nations from the ideology of 
communism, and the role of their nations as a vanguard against the persistent threat 
posed by Russia and the perceived uncivilised East. Such historical experiences and 
understandings of World War Two have made nationalism a strong part of the identity 
and political rhetoric of Eastern European nations (Kuljic, 2005). Their different 
historical collective memories in regards to World War two, particularly concerning 
their sympathy for Jewish suffering when compared with their own, and also the 
importance of nationalism for their social identity, makes the use of such terms, along 
with those of ‘anti-Semites’ and ‘nationalists’ to characterise the threat in Ukraine and 
Europe, influential in their ability to divide opinion socially within NATO member 
states in regards to whether ‘neo-fascists’, ‘Nazis’ or the ‘glorification of Nazism’ poses 
a threat. The context of the threat of historical and ever lingering ‘fascism’ and 
‘Nazism’ in Europe, can potentially isolate Eastern European states, who may consider 
fascistic and anti-Semitic elements within their societies and political discourse as 
normal (Hockenos, 2013, p. 300), and in the eyes of Western European audiences, who 
are more influenced from the use of such terms in regards to threats, see the region as 
one from where threats may arise. Thus NATO’s appeal to European audiences in their 
act of securitization, focusing on the historical threat of the Soviet Union’s occupation 
of Europe, is more likely to engage the BABE’s of Eastern European audiences who 
suffered from such an occupation, whereas Russia’s appeals to the threats of ‘neo-
fascists’, ‘Nazis’, ‘anti-Semites’ and ‘nationalists’ are more likely to engage the 
BABE’s of audiences of key decision making Western European nations within NATO 
and the EU, such as Germany.  
The positional power of Russia as an influential actor is also increased due to its ability 
to relativize Europe’s current social climate with a historical context that echoes a 
situation whereby Russia has had to act historically to maintain European and its own 
security. As Russian nationhood, identity and dignity are largely built around the social 
narrative of their victory in World War Two and the perception of Russia as a vanguard 
against historical Western aggression (Dzyyadko, 2014; Uldricks, 2009), Russian 
society is easily securitized when their security is brought into question through such 
notions as ‘neo-fascists’ or ‘Nazism’ (Lehti, Jutila, & Jokisipilä, 2008). This is 
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highlighted by Roshwald (2006, p. 122), who argues that national dignity and security 
are inherently intertwined, whereby the questioning of the narrative of the nation also 
brings into question the identity and dignity of its citizens and those who identify with 
such a narrative. During the Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s national dignity and identity 
has been brought into question. The rejection of the Russian led Customs and Eurasian 
Union, in favour of European integration, a change of government who are non-
representative of Russia’s interests, the toppling of Soviet era monuments which 
symbolize Russia’s national sacrifice during World War Two, the attempted removal of 
the Russian language as an official one in Ukraine, and the designation of Russia as an 
adversary rather than a partner by NATO, all culminate to create an environment of 
perceived threats against the dignity, identity and wellbeing of the Russian state, which 
leads subsequently to the ease of its securitization. The threat of ‘Nationalists’, ‘neo-
Nazis’,‘neo-fascists’ and ‘Nazism’ in Ukraine and Europe  is relativized by Russia to be 
representative of both the crimes of the Nazis of the past, and the current rise of 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and right wing politics throughout Europe. As Putin states; 
‘… and in a year’s time will celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Soviet people’s 
victory in the Great Patriotic War, the victory over Nazism and fascism. This is still 
relevant today, as we can see. I will not cite the numerous examples now, but this is a 
real problem today.’ (Kremlin, 2014, April 24th) 
While largely overblown in its discourse and IAPW, the mixing of a small amount of 
present day truth with a historically based threat, gives Russia an empirical platform 
from where they are able to argue that what is happening in Ukraine, is also threatening 
Europe, just as it has done in the past (Poulsen, 2014). Its historical defense against 
fascist, Nazis, nationalists and the German onslaught during World War Two, had left 
Russia and the Soviet Union in an authoritative and influential position in post war 
European security and stability (Croft & Williams, 1992, p. 77). Through its use of a 
threat that has historical context based in World War Two, and is related to both threats 
past and present, Russia’s positional power as an influential actor is increased, due to it 
being able to justifying and relativize its current position in Ukraine with its historical 
defense against such threats, from which historically it has had to act to maintain 
European security and stability. 
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Russia’s process of desecuritization has focused on both attempting to create a failure of 
NATO’s act of securitization and also replacing the threat posed by its military to 
Europe with an ideological threat, revolving the around the notions of ‘fascism’ and 
‘Nazism’ through its counter securitization. It has constructed the strategy of strategic 
ambiguity in three distinct ways. It has refused to either deny or confirm their 
recognition of the Ukrainian leadership under Petro Poroschenko, allowing its 
international audiences to maintain their existing impressions in regards to its 
legitimacy, and their IAPW to continue to insinuate that it is illegitimate. It has used 
AW and the concealment of its troops to engage in deniability, allowing Russia to 
rearticulate NATO’s constructed threat of Russian military aggression and intervention 
as not that of their own doing, but that of locals and civilians in Ukraine. This has 
allowed Russia’s IAPW to deny NATO the use of imagery in its act of securitization, 
and use images of suffering civilians, local separatists, and Ukrainian radicals for the 
purposes of desecuritization. And it has used an ambiguous ideological threat that is 
embedded in both Europe and Russia’s historical memory to appeal to and foster a 
diverse range of ideological viewpoints amongst its European audiences in attempting 
to replace NATO’s Russian military threat, with its IAPW targeting the fringes of both 
sides of the political divide, conspiracy theorists and issue motivated groups to allow for 
a unified diversity and multiple interpretations of the threat. 
Its use of strategic ambiguity to foster the perception of an illegitimate Ukrainian 
leadership, backed by ideological extremists, the US and the West, and deniability of 
their military forces to allow for a relativist view of them as local civilian separatists, 
allows for multiple interpretations and uncertainty in their understanding by Russia’s 
European and international audiences in regards to the threats and referents of NATO 
and Russia’s competing securitizations, whereby Russia can relativize the conflict in 
Ukraine with the conflict of Kosovo, arguing that is actions and support for separatists 
in the country, is the same as NATO’s actions and support for separatists in Kosovo, 
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where it has set the precedent for such actions to happen. This argument attempts to 
delegitimise and dejustify NATO’s act of securitization, whereby the notion of a 
Russian military threat to an ‘open, rules-based international system’ is unfounded, and 
the support for separatists against illegitimate regimes is the new norm set by the 
Kosovo precedent in the international system of relations and law. 
It’s shaping of the context of the Ukrainian conflict, using an ambiguous ideological 
threat that appeals to and engages a diverse range of ideological viewpoints to be 
unified in diversity, is relativized in both a historical context of World War 2 and 
current social context of rising xenophobia and right wing politics in Europe. This 
allows Russia to take advantage of the social embeddedness of this threat, increasing the 
power of its threat articulation, as ideological notions revolving around the threat of 
‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ serve as both a natural facilitator for Western European 
desecuritization and Russian securitization, and potentially divide Western and Eastern 
Europe societies in their interpretation of it. Russia’s positional power is also increased 
by relativizing this threat in Ukraine, as one that is also visible in Europe, giving Russia 
an empirical platform to argue for their defense against this threat, just as they have 
done in the past. 
As a tactic for desecuritization, Russia’s use of strategic ambiguity serves to both foster 
multiple interpretations of a given issue from where an alternative narrative can be more 
successfully articulated or rearticulated, and uses a counter threat that makes diverse 
targeted audiences more unified in their interpretation of it, and more likely to engage 
an alternative narrative. By fostering multiple interpretations of threats and referents, 
strategic ambiguity also creates division. The attempt to create interpretational division 
of the conflict in Ukraine takes two levels. Socially between mainstream society and 
ideologically and issue motivated individuals and groups, who are more likely to engage 
in a unified diversity and consider a range of actors such as the Ukrainian leadership, 
other ideological groups, the US, the EU and the West as ‘neo fascists’ or ‘Nazis’, and 
geographically between Western and Eastern European nations, through differing 





The success of the use of strategic ambiguity in Russia’s desecuritization is a difficult 
one to measure. While it has been shown in this research that strategic ambiguity has 
been constructed to foster multiple interpretations of threats and referents, and how this 
strategic ambiguity has been used to influence its targeted audiences, there are many 
variables which serve to influence an audience’s perceptions and BABE’s in relation to 
the conflict in Ukraine, just as there are many variables that influence the process of 
desecuritization. These variables can range from media penetration and reach, geo 
political realities, historical relations and differences, political relations, to the differing 
BABE’s of individuals. When measured in the context of the ability to desecuritize 
NATO’s act of securitization, the overall strategy of using strategic ambiguity as a tactic 
to desecuritize can be measured. Using Salter’s (2008) chain of measurement which 
focuses on the degree to which policies and opinions accords with the process of 
securitization, it can be argued that Russia’s strategically ambiguous desecuritization 
has achieved mixed results. 
Extraordinary political and economic measures have been taken by NATO, the US and 
the EU, yet no emergency powers have been accorded to NATO. All of NATO’s 
securitization actions fall in the category of extraordinary measures taken, rather than 
emergency powers forwarded. It could be argued that Russia’s use of AW, its 
characterisation of the threat in Ukraine and Europe as an ambiguous ideological one, 
and its securitized referent as a cultural ethnic one, has successfully contributed to pre-
emptively desecuritizing a potential NATO intervention in the Ukrainian conflict, 
convincing its decision makers that such an intervention would be too difficult and too 
costly. This is highlighted by NATO’s concern of how to respond should such similar 
AW and strategic ambiguity be used in a conflict against a NATO member country, 
particularly the Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia who have significant Russian ethnic 
minorities. 
In a recent report by the Polish think tank Institute of Public Affairs (Kucharczyk, 
2015); the report focuses on analysing population perceptions in relations between 
Russia, Poland and Germany in relation to the Ukrainian conflict. In analysing the 
perception of the Russian military as a threat, the report found that 76% of Poles and 
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only 41% of Germans perceived the Russian military as a threat. As in 2008 77% of 
Poles perceived Russia as a military threat, it can be argued that Russia’s attempted 
desecuritization in Poland has been ineffective. Germany’s lack of a Russian military 
threat perception is part of worrisome trend in the country, considering a Harris poll 
(FT, 2008, September 22nd) found 50% of the country would oppose national troops 
going to the defense of the three Baltic States. The same Institute of Public Affairs 
report also found that 61% of Poles blame Russia for the conflict, 20% believe that both 
Russia and Ukraine are responsible for the conflict, and 6% blame Ukraine, while 39% 
of Germans blame Russia for the conflict, 43% believe that both Russia and Ukraine are 
responsible for the conflict and 10% blame Ukraine. Such a difference in perceptions in 
regards to both Russia as a threat and who holds responsibility for the conflict 
highlights the influence of the historical context in threat perception. The differing 
historical threat perceptions of both nations in regards to the context of post-World War 
Two Europe is able to be taken advantage of in Russia’s strategically ambiguous 
attempted desecuritization and counter securitization by focusing on the counter threat 
of ‘neo fascists’ and ‘Nazism’, and its relativisation with the Ukrainian government, to 
serve as a natural facilitator for the desecuritization of German society and other 
Western European states that are more likely to be influenced and desecuritized through 
such a historical context than Eastern European nations. With a low threat perception of 
the Russian military and higher blame of both Russia and Ukraine for the conflict than 
simply Russia alone, it could be argued that Russia’s attempt to desecuritize and replace 
the threat of its military with that of an ideological threat that revolves around the 
historical threat of ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’, has had some degree of success in being 
able to stigmatise the Ukrainian leadership and increase the perception of ‘neo fascists’ 
and ‘Nazism’ as a potential threat in Germany and other Western European nations.  
The report found that 76% of Poles and 67% of Germans also believed that economic 
sanctions against Russia should either be kept in placed or strengthened, indicating that 
extraordinary measures by NATO and the EU against Russia are still widely supported 
among European audiences, and that Russia’s attempt to return relations to a ‘business 
as usual’ approach with NATO and the EU has been unsuccessful. 
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Russia has also been unsuccessful in desecuritizing NATO’s Russian military threat to 
decision makers in regards to it being a part of a wider political debate, with recent 
motions in the EU parliament still stressing and condemning the threat the Russian 
military poses by its actions in Ukraine (EU Parliament, 2015, January 12th), and NATO 
still condemning ‘Russia’s aggressive actions’ (NATO, 2015, May 13th).  
Thus it can be argued that Russia’s strategically ambiguous attempted desecuritization 
against NATO and EU decision makers has achieved some degree of success, by aiding 
the limitation of the possible emergence of emergency security powers, yet largely 
unsuccessful in its ability to remove the Russian military threat out of a threat defence 
sequence in the political sphere. It can also be argued that it has achieved success in 
influencing the perceptions and BABE’s of Western European audiences in regards to 
both reducing threat perceptions of the Russian military, and replacing it with an 
ideological threat that revolves around the notions of ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’, however 
both Western and Eastern European populations still largely support extraordinary 
measures that have been put in to place. Thus it can be argued that Russia has been 
unsuccessful in its attempted desecuritization of NATO’s act of securitization, and has 
thus far been unable to return to a ‘business as usual’ approach. 
The strength of this research lay in its ability to be able to identify and analyse how 
Russia has constructed and used strategic ambiguity to influence targeted audiences for 
the purposes and process of desecuritization. Yet it is limited by its inability to 
successfully conclude if the use of strategic ambiguity has been the factor that has 
successfully influenced for the purposes and process of desecuritization. For this, 
further quantitative research is needed in regards to the perceptions and BABE’s of 
Russia’s European and international audiences as to how they perceive the legitimacy of 
the Ukrainian government, the identity of forces on the ground in Ukraine and current 
threat perceptions in Europe to more accurately determine the ability of strategic 
ambiguity to be used as a tactic for desecuritization. However the potential for such 
research is also limited, due to the difficulty in measuring such variables before and 
after a securitization and desecuritization scenario takes place that uses strategic 
ambiguity without the previous anticipation and knowledge of its occurrence to 
determine a change in specific perceptions. 
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While largely unsuccessful in desecuritizing NATO’s act of securitization, it can be 
argued that strategic ambiguity has had success in being able to influence the 
perceptions and BABE’s of its targeted audiences, specifically those in Western Europe. 
High levels of anti-Americanism, opposition to the EU and diverse issue motivated 
groups in the region who can be influenced by the historical threat of fascism, makes its 
populations more likely to be influenced by Russia’s use of strategic ambiguity in their 
IAPW and strategic communications. Russia’s use of the counter securitization threat 
and context of ‘fascists’ and ‘Nazism’ and its association with the Ukrainian 
government, who are backed by radicals, the US, the EU and the West, allows for such 
diverse perceptions to be united through strategic ambiguity using terms which can be 
considered and perceived as a common threat, and divide Western European opinion 
socially, and the continent geographically as to the legitimacy of the Ukrainian 
leadership and the greater threat faced in Europe. This is compounded by the difficulty 
in justifying a Russian military threat to Western Europe, especially when the degree of 
involvement of the Russian military in the Ukrainian conflict is uncertain, the AW 
being waged in Ukraine is a low level conflict, and their geographic security is buffered 
by Eastern Europe. The ability of strategic ambiguity to divide threat perceptions in 
Western Europe, given time, could greatly assist in the desecuritization of the region 
and a return to a ‘business as usual’ approach with Russia. 
 
4.3. Recommendations 
This research has shown how strategic ambiguity has been constructed within Russia’s 
political discourse, AW campaign, and IAPW in order to influence targeted audiences. 
Thus in developing policies, doctrines and tactics to be able to successfully safeguard 
NATO and its member states from the ability of strategic ambiguity to be used as a 
tactic for desecuritization, NATO needs to focus on measures that either restrict the 
number of potential interpretations in regards to attempts to delegitimise and dejustify 
its threats to referents, or use strategic ambiguity to increase their own potential 
interpretations that counters desecuritization and appeals to diverse range of viewpoints 
for their securitized audiences in order to attempt to counter the division of 
interpretations of given issues. These measures should specifically target Russian ethnic 
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and cultural audiences and conspiracy minded, issue motivated and fringe political 
groups within Europe and the international arena that are more likely to be influenced 
by Russia’s strategic ambiguity and IAPW tactics. 
Strategic ambiguity itself is a difficult strategy to counter, due to it being dependent on 
a sender’s intention and an individual’s interpretation. A greater willingness from 
NATO to engage in a more aggressive IAPW campaign aimed at desecuritizing Russian 
audiences is an area that is severely lacking when compared with Russia’s ability to be 
able to project its own interests and narratives, specifically in Europe and the US 
through its growing reach and number of instruments for IAPW and strategic 
communications such as RT. A much more purposeful and engaging campaign is 
needed in this area, that has the capability to be able to influence and engage  both 
European and Russian audiences to counter balance Russia’s current ability of being 
able to so easily securitize and unify its own population and create opposition within 
NATO member states for the purposes of desecuritization. 
A much broader educational approach for European audiences, particularly ethnic and 
cultural Russians who are more easily threatened by Russia’s use of an ambiguous 
ideological threat and cultural ethnic referent, is also needed in regards to how Russia 
consistently uses a strategically ambiguous ideological threat revolving around the 
notions of fascism and Nazism for the purposes of securitization and desecuritization. 
Its ability to engage audiences by relativising historical and current threats and also 
Russia’s historical and current actions is an issue the wider public should understand so 
as to restrict Russia from engaging the BABE’s of its targeted audiences through 
historical and social context. By educating the public on this issue, this will limit 
Russia’s ability to desecuritize European audiences and its capability to be able to 















Aldis, A. C., & McDermott, R. N. (2004). Russian Military Reform, 1992-2002: Taylor & Francis. 
Alker, H. R. (2006). On securitization politics as contexted texts and talk1.Journal of 
International relations and Development, 9(1), 70-80. 
Aradau, C. (2004). Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation. 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 7(4), 388-413.  
Arquilla, J. (1999). Ethics and information warfare. RAND-PUBLICATIONS-MR-ALL SERIES-, 379-
402.  
Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. 
European journal of international relations, 11(2), 171-201.  
Balzacq, T. (2014). Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics: Routledge. 
Benson, B. V., & Niou, E. M. (2000). Comprehending strategic ambiguity: US policy toward the 
Taiwan Strait security issue. Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Duke 
University.  
Bērziņš, J. (2014). RUSSIA’S NEW GENERATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LATVIAN DEFENSE POLICY.  National Defence Academy of Latvia: Centre for Security 
and Strategic Research. 
Bidder, B. (2013). Russia Today: Putin’s weapon in the war of the images. Spiegel Online. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/putin-fights-war-of-images-and-
propaganda-with-russia-today-channel-a-916162.html 
Breedlove, P., M. . (2014). The meaning of Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine. . The 
Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/articles/phil-breedlove-the-meaning-of-
russias-military-campaign-against-ukraine-1405552018  
Breeze, R. (2013). Critical discourse analysis and its critics. Pragmatics, 21(4). 
Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Chekinov , S., G. , & Bogdanov , S., A. (2013). The Nature and Content of a New Generation 
War. Military Thought(4), 12 - 23.  
Committee, U. K. H. o. C. D. (2014). Defence Committee - Third Report. Towards the next 
Defence and Security Review: Part Two-NATO. . 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmdfence/358/35802
.htm  
Croft, S., & Williams, P. (1992). European Security Without the Soviet Union: F. Cass. 
Darczewska, J. (2014). The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a 
case study. OSW Point of View.   
Defence, U. K. M. o. (2013). Joint Doctrine Note 2/13. Information Superiority. . 
Denis, J.-L., Dompierre, G., Langley, A., & Rouleau, L. (2011). Escalating Indecision: Between 
Reification and Strategic Ambiguity. Organization Science, 22(1), 225-244.  
Downes, R. (1999). Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st 
Century: DTIC Document. 
Dzyyadko, T. (2014). Putin is using WW11 for Propaganda Because It's the Best Memory That 




Eisenberg, E. M. (1984). Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. 
Communication monographs, 51(3), 227-242.  
EU Parliament (2015, January 12th). Motion for a resolution on the situation in Ukraine – B8-
0029/2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B8-
2015-0029+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN  
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity. 
Fairclough, N. L. (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study Language. Harlow, UK: 
Longman. 
Fako, E. (2012). Strategies of Desecuritization. Central European University.    
FitzGerald, M. C. (1994). The Russian military's strategy for “sixth generation” warfare. Orbis, 
38(3), 457-476.  
Friedman, G. (2007). Beyond Fourth Generation Warfare. The Officer: Reserve Officers 
Association National Security Report, 57-60.  
Frunzeti, T. (2013). Asymmetric, Unconventional and Hybrid Actions in 21st Century Warfare. 
Strategic Impact, 46(1).  
FT (Producer). (2008). Europeans see Moscow as security threat. Retrieved from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4530e1dc-88f0-11dd-a179-
0000779fd18c.html#axzz3ZmEkHtbN 
General, G. o. P. E. r. t. t. N. S. (2014). Collective Defence and Common Security: Twin Pillars of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_06/20140606_140602-peg-
collective_defence.pdf  
Giles, K. (2011). “Information Troops”-A Russian Cyber Command? Paper presented at the 
Cyber Conflict (ICCC), 2011 3rd International Conference on. 
Given, L. M. (2008). The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods: A-L ; Vol. 2, M-Z 
Index: SAGE. 
Goble, P. (1999). Russia: Analysis From Washington – A Real Battle On The Virtual Front. Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1092360.html  
Goodall, B., Trethewey, A., & McDonald, K. (2006). Strategic ambiguity, communication, and 
public diplomacy in an uncertain world: Principles and practices. Consortium for 
Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, 1-14.  
Hallahan, K., Holtzhausen, D., Van Ruler, B., Verčič, D., & Sriramesh, K. (2007). Defining 
strategic communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 1(1), 3-35.  
Hammes, T. X. (2007). Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, FIFTH EMERGES. Military Review, 
87(3), 14-23.  
Hansen, L. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen 
School and directions for how to apply it. Review of International Studies, 38(03), 525-
546.  
Harris, F. C. (2006). It takes a tragedy to arouse them: Collective memory and collective action 
during the civil rights movement. Social movement studies, 5(1), 19-43.  
Heickerö, R. (2010). Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and 
Information Operations: Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). 
Hockenos, P. (2013). Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Hom, S. K., & Yamamoto, E. K. (1999). Collective memory, history, and social justice. UCLA L. 
Rev., 47, 1747.  
Hutchby, I. (2001). Oh', irony and sequential ambiguity in arguments. Discourse & Society, 
12(2), 123-141.  
66 
 
Hutchinson, W. (2002). Concepts in information warfare. Logistics Information Management, 
15(5/6), 410-413.  
Hutchinson, W., & Warren, M. (2001). Principles of information warfare. Journal of Information 
Warfare, 1(1), 1-6.  
Huysmans, J. (1995). Migrants as a security problem: dangers of ‘securitizing’societal issues: na 
Huysmans, J. (1998). The question of the limit: Desecuritisation and the aesthetics of horror in 
political realism. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 27(3), 569-+.  
Hyslop, M. (2014). Obstructive Marketing: Restricting Distribution of Products and Services in 
the Age of Asymmetric Warfare: Ashgate Publishing, Limited. 
Influence. (Ed.) (2015) Merriam Webster. 
Janks, H. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool. Discourse: Studies in the 
Cultural Politics of Education, 18(3), 329-342. doi: 10.1080/0159630970180302 
Jones, A., Jones, A., Kovacich, G. L., & Luzwick, P. G. (2002). Global Information Warfare: How 
Businesses, Governments, and Others Achieve Objectives and Attain Competitive 
Advantages: Taylor & Francis. 
Jutila, M. (2006). Desecuritizing minority rights: Against determinism. Security Dialogue, 37(2), 
167-185.  
Kaufmann, C. (1996a). Intervention in ethnic and ideological civil wars: Why one can be done 
and the other can't. Security Studies, 6(1), 62-101.  
Kaufmann, C. (1996b). Possible and impossible solutions to ethnic civil wars. International 
security, 20(4), 136-175.  
Kipp, W., J., McDermott, R. . (2014). Putin’s Smart Defense: Wars, Rumors of War, and 
Generations of Wars. The Jamestown foundation. Eurasian Daily Monitor. 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42512&no_cache=1#.
VM4G1GiUc9Y  
Kucharczyk, J., Lada, A., Scholer, G., Wenerski, L. (2015). Close together or far apart? Poles, 
Germans and Russians on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Institute of Public Affairs. The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Kuljic, T. (2005). Revised History and New Identity in East Europe. Identities - Journal for 
Politics, Gender, and Culture, 4, 63 - 86.  
Lehti, M., Jutila, M., & Jokisipilä, M. (2008). Never-ending Second World War: Public 
performances of national dignity and the drama of the Bronze soldier. Journal of Baltic 
Studies, 39(4), 393-418.  
Leitch, S., & Davenport, S. (2007). Strategic ambiguity as a discourse practice: the role of 
keywords in the discourse on ‘sustainable’biotechnology. Discourse Studies, 9(1), 43-
61.  
Lester, P. M. (2006). Syntactic theory of visual communication.  Retrieved from 
http://blog.kareldonk.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/SyntacticTheoryofVisualCommunication.pdf 
Libicki, M. C. (1995). What is information warfare? : DTIC Document. 
Lind, W. S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J. F., Sutton, J. W., & Wilson, G. I. (1989). The Changing 
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Marine Corps Gazette (pre-1994), 73(10), 22-
26.  
Linkevicius, L. (2014). Social media update. . Twitter. 
https://twitter.com/linkeviciusl/status/442607548303425536  
Lockyer, A. (2011). Foreign Intervention and warfare in civil wars. Review of International 
Studies, 37(05), 2337-2364.  
Manis, M. (1961). The interpretation of opinion statements as a function of message ambiguity 
and recipient attitude. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 76–81 
67 
 
McDonald, M. (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. European journal of 
international relations, 14(4), 563-587.  
Murphy, D. M. (2008). The trouble with strategic communication (s): DTIC Document. 
NATO. (1997). Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and 
the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm. 
NATO. (2015, May 15th). Press conferenceby NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
following the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_119430.htm?selectedLocale=en  
Paul, J., & Strbiak, C. A. (1997). The ethics of strategic ambiguity. Journal of Business 
Communication, 34(2), 149-159.  
Pomerantsev, P., Weiss,M. . (2014). The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes 
Information, Culture and Money. A Special Report presented by the Interpreter 
Institute of Modern Russia. 
http://imrussia.org/media/pdf/Research/Michael_Weiss_and_Peter_Pomerantsev__T
he_Menace_of_Unreality.pdf  
Poulsen, N., B. (2014). The Past as Strategy - Russia and its use of history in the Ukraine 
conflict. Contemporary Conflicts. Royal Danish Defence College. 
Reding, A., Weed, K., & Ghez, J. J. (2010). NATO's Strategic Communications concept and its 
relevance for France.  
Roshwald, A. (2006). The endurance of nationalism: ancient roots and modern dilemmas: 
Cambridge University Press. 
RFE/RL (Producer). (2014, March 1st). Parliament OKs Putin Request To Use Russian Forces In 
Ukraine. . Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-forces-
russian/25281291.html 
RT (Producer). (2014, March 21st). Facts only: Kosovo vs Crimea - 'Good Independence' vs 'Bad 
Referendum'. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/kosovo-crimea-referendum-
recognition-441/  
RT (Producer). (2014, May 3rd). Over ten shot dead by Right Sector radicals near Slavyansk in 
Estern Ukraine. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/156584-right-sector-deaths-
ukraine/   
RT (Producer). (2014, September 30th). Ukraine authorities in massive ‘Rename Soviet Places’ 
drive. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/191784-kiev-soviet-streets-renaming/ 
Rumelili, B. (2014). Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties: Taylor & 
Francis. 
Salter, M. B. (2008). Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the 
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 11(4), 321-349. 
Santos, S. J. (2010). Peace, Media and the de-securitization of post-conflict societies. SGIR, 
Stockholm, September 
Schenk, T. (2014). Crisis in Ukraine: What is NATO’s role? . The Atlantic Council of Canada. 
http://natocouncil.ca/crisis-in-ukraine-what-is-natos-role/  
Schmid, A. (2005). Terrorism as psychological warfare. Democracy and Security, 1(2), 137-146.  
Sim, A. B., & Fernando, M. (2010). Strategic ambiguity and ethical actions.  
Smith, S. W., Atkin, C. K., & Roznowski, J. (2006). Are "Drink Responsibly" Alcohol Campaigns 
Strategically Ambiguous? Health Communication, 20(1), 1-11.  
Sneijder, P., & Te Molder, H. F. (2005). Moral logic and logical morality: Attributions of 
responsibility and blame in online discourse on veganism. Discourse & Society, 16(5), 
675-696.  
Staff, U. J. C. o. (2003). Joint Publication 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.  
68 
 
Staff, U. J. C. o. (2010). Joint Publication 3-13.2. Psychological Operations.  
Steinberg, M. W. (1998). Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action framing from a 
discursive turn. Theory and Society, 27(6), 845-872.  
Stephenson, P., & Gilbert, K. (1999). Investigating Computer-Related Crime: CRC Press. 
Stritzel, H. (2007). Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. European 
journal of international relations, 13(3), 357-383,449.  
Taddeo, M. (2012). Information warfare: A philosophical perspective. Philosophy & 
Technology, 25(1), 105-120.  
Tatham, S. (2013). US Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A 
Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict: DTIC Document. 
Taureck, R. (2006). Securitization theory and securitization studies. Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 9(1), 53-61.  
Thomas, T. (2014). Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future 
Conflicts? The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27(1), 101-130.  
Thomas, T. L. (1999). Human network attacks. Military Review, 79(5), 23.  
Tomes, R. R. (2004). Relearning counterinsurgency warfare. Parameters, 34(1), 16.  
Treadwell, M. B. (1998). When Does a Act of Information Warfare Become an Act of War? 
Ambiguity in Perception: DTIC Document. 
Uldricks, T. J. (2009). War, politics and memory: Russian historians reevaluate the origins of 
World War II. History & Memory, 21(2), 60-82.  
United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee, O. E. (2014). Defence Committee - 




Van Dijk, T, A.(2001).Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. Tannen, D. Schiffrin & H. Hamilton (Eds.), 
Handbook of Discourse Analysis. (pp. 352-371). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Van Dijk, T. A. (1989). Structures of discourse and structures of power. Communication 
yearbook, 12, 18-59.  
Von Clausewitz, C., Howard, M., & Paret, P. (1989). On War: Princeton University Press. 
Watson, S. D. (2009). The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking 
Boats: Taylor & Francis. 
Wæver, O. (1995). ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed 
              .,OnSecurity, 46 – 86, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Weiss, G., Wodak, R. (2002). Introduction: Theory, interdisciplinarity and critical discourse 
analysis. In G. Weiss and R. Wodak (eds.), Critical Discourse Analysis: Theory and 
Interdisciplinarity. London:Palgrave Macmillan. 
Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics. 
International studies quarterly, 47(4), 511-531.  
Williams, P. A. (2010). Information Warfare: Time for a redefinition. Paper presented at the 
11th Australian Information Warfare Conference. 
Герасимов, В. (2013). необходимо перосмыслить формы и способы веденпя беовых 
действий. Военно-промышленный курьер, 8(476). http://vpk-
news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf 
Russian article by General Valery Gerasimov in February 27th, 2013 "Military-Industrial Kurier" 






NATO speeches and transcripts 
 
NATO. (2014, February 26th). Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers 
session.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_107408.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, March 2nd). Doorstep statement by the NATO Secretary General before the 
meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Ukraine Commission.  Retrieved 
from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_107663.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, March 19th). ''Why NATO Matters to America'' - Speech by NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Brookings Institution.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108087.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, March 21st). ''A strong NATO in a changed world'' - Speech by NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the ''Brussels Forum.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108215.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, April 1st). Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
following the first day of meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  Retrieved 
from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108511.htm?selectedLocale=en.  
NATO. (2014, April 4th). ''A new strategic reality in Europe'' - Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary 
General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow to the 21st International Conference on 
Euro-Atlantic Security, Krakow, Poland.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108889.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014,April 8th). Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 
NATO Transformation Seminar, Paris.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108909.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, April 11th). Remarks by Assistant Secretary General Kolinda Grabar at the Kyiv 
Security Forum.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_109120.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, April 30th). Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander 
Vershbow at the Atlantic Council of the United States Conference ‘’Toward a Europe 
whole and free’’, Washington DC.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_109419.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, May 9th). ''Defending Allies, Sharing responsibility, Upholding values'' - Speech by 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Tallinn University, Estonia.  
Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_109757.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, September 4th). Joint press conference by the NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen and the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko during the NATO 
Summit held in Newport, Wales.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_112483.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO. (2014, September 5th). Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of 






Kremlin speeches and transcripts 
 
Kremlin. (2014, March 4th). Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in 
Ukraine. Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366. 
Kremlin. (2014, March 18th). Address by President of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. 
Kremlin. (2014, April 17th). Direct Line with Vladimir Putin Retrieved from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796. 
Kremlin. (2014, April 24th). Media Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media. Retrieved 
from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20858. 
Kremlin. (2014, June 4th). Vladimir Putin’s interview with Radio Europe 1 and TF1 TV channel. 
Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45832. 
Kremlin. (2014, July 1st). Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives. 
Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46131. 
Kremlin. (2014, July 22nd). Security Council meeting. Retrieved from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46305. 
Kremlin. (2014, October 15th). Interview to Politika newspaper. Retrieved from 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46806. 
 
